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1. Searches of the Westlaw “allnews” database conducted on March 31, 2006 revealed 2,571documents using the phrase “judicial activism” in 2005 alone, and 2,159 using the phrases “activistjudge” or “activist judges” in that same time period.2. See generally Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “JudicialActivism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (identifying five distinct “core meanings” of the term).3. See, e.g., David B. Sentelle, Judge Dave & The Rainbow People, 3 GREEN BAG 61, 61(1999) (noting conservative “concerns about activist liberal judges who overstep the proper boundsof office and try to be legislators and executives”); Book Note, A Bold Leap Backward?, 108HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2049 (1995) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS:HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) andnoting Glendon’s condemnation of “the unprovoked activism of judges who overstep theirbounds.”).
2. Changes Affecting the Ability to Monitor . . . . . . . . . . 7713. Effects on Fulfillment of the Adjudicative Duty . . . . . 775 IV. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS INFORMATIONAL REGULATION . . . . . . 779A. An Overview of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7801. The Benefits of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . 7822. The Costs of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 7853. The Importance of Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 786B. Judicial Opinions as Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . 7871. Devices for the Creation of Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7882. Devices to Facilitate Monitoring of Adjudication . . . . 7903. Devices to Affect Performance of the JudicialFunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 792  V. FRAMING ARGUMENTS—USING THE OPINION FORMTO RESTORE ADJUDICATIVE LEGITIMACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 794A. Framing Arguments as a Means to Combat Judicial Inactivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7961. Effects on the Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . 7962. Effects on Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7973. Additional Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798a. Improved Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798b. Enhanced Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799B. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800 VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801I.  INTRODUCTIONConcern about so-called “judicial activism” is rampant.  Despite a lack1of consensus regarding precisely what the term means,  those wielding it2have in mind judges who overstep the bounds of their role.  “Activist”3
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4. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 259 (1990) (noting thetendency to regard “Article III solely as a limitation on the courts, and not as an exhortation toperform certain tasks”);  Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237,1237 (2004) (“Contemporary constitutional law in its quest for judicial restraint, has primarilyfocused on ‘the how’ of judging—what interpretive methods will constrain the decisionmaker?”).5. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and theDuty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 123 n.4 (2005).6. See infra Part III.B-C.7. See infra Part III.C.8. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
judges usurp the authority of the political branches, decide issues notproperly before them, and generally do more than is necessary to resolvethe disputes they face. Legal scholarship has tended to reflect theseconcerns, with most of the debate over the proper functions of courtsdirected toward defining the outer bounds of the judicial power.4In contrast, what might be termed “judicial inactivism”—judges doingless than their role requires—receives little systematic attention.  This is5somewhat curious. A judicial failure to act—such as when a court fails toaddress one of the claims before it—preserves the status quo, which canbe every bit as consequential as the changes to the status quo resultingfrom judicial action. If it is legitimate to be concerned about judicial actionthat exceeds proper limits, then it should be equally legitimate to beconcerned about improper judicial inaction. Indeed, because a court thatfails to act will generally be less obtrusive than a court that does act,perhaps judicial inactivism should receive more attention than judicialactivism.This is not to suggest that law journals are utterly bereft of articlessuggesting that courts are doing less than what is (or should be) requiredof them. The literature concerning the processes of appellate courts, forexample, consistently bemoans the fact that the appellate process nolonger includes many of the features once thought integral to appellateadjudication.  Courts no longer hear oral argument or issue published,6precedential opinions in every case, and the opinions they do issue are asmuch or more the product of law clerks than the judges themselves.  7These phenomena, however, are but mere symptoms of the largerproblem, which is that caseloads have expanded at a rate far greater thanthe judiciary itself.  Judges consequently have considerably less time to8devote to each case than their predecessors. What has resulted might becharacterized as involving multiple varieties of judicial inactivism. Thesystemic failure to accord cases the same level of process as in the pastcould be viewed as a generalized form of inactivism. At the level of theindividual case, the combination of time pressure and reduced judicialengagement might result in inaction flowing from courts’ inability torecognize meritorious issues for what they are. Most dramatically, the
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9. See infra Part III.C.3.10. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 185 (2d ed.1996) (“The idea that the nation will suffer if judges do not have as much time for each case as theyonce did is integral to the ideology of the American legal profession.”).12. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.13. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.14. See infra Part II.
bureaucratization and impersonalization of the process have led to anatmosphere in which it is easy to imagine judges willfully avoidingpotentially meritorious issues simply because of a lack of effectivemechanisms to prevent them from doing so. Overall, nearly everyoneagrees the quality of appellate justice has suffered.9Reform proposals have abounded.  Indeed, many of the systemic10features now considered part of the problem were themselves reforms.Underlying nearly all of these reforms and proposed reforms is the ideathat restoring the quality of appellate justice requires restoring to appellatejudges what they no longer enjoy, namely adequate time to devote to theircases.  Thus each reform effort seeks to return some of that lost time to11judges, such as by directing a portion of the caseload elsewhere  or12shifting a portion of the process of adjudication to other courts or to non-judicial personnel.13What is largely absent from this prior work is consideration of theasserted problems and proposed reforms in light of a deeper conception ofwhat the appellate process, or adjudication more generally, ought toachieve. This Article seeks to fill that gap. Rather than simply working onthe assumption that restoring adjudicative legitimacy requires lesseningjudicial workloads, it first draws on prominent models of Americanadjudication to articulate a vision of the “adjudicative duty”—the minimalcomponents of legitimate adjudication.  Despite the distinctly different14emphases of those models, they share a common conception of courts’minimum obligations that is rooted primarily in the value each accords toparty participation. This conception includes a duty to be at least “weaklyresponsive” to the parties’ claims, meaning that a judicial decision shouldsquarely confront the parties’ proofs and arguments even if the courtconcludes the case is more properly resolved on other grounds. It alsoincludes a strong preference for the court to provide full and candidelaboration on the reasons for its decision. None of this, it bears noting,involves a prescription that courts engage in adjudicative conduct thatdiffers substantially from the behavior we intuitively expect from judges.We sense that courts should grapple with the contentions the parties putbefore them and that judicial opinions should accurately reflect thatprocess. Thus, the value of articulating the adjudicative duty lies not in
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15. See infra Part II.C.16. See infra Part III.17. See infra Part IV.18. See infra Part IV.B.2.
discovering new things that judges ought to be doing, but rather inrevealing the theoretical underpinnings for and fundamental nature ofthose things we have reflexively viewed as part of the judging process.Having identified the minimal components of legitimate adjudication,the Article next takes up the question of whether current institutionalarrangements are up to the task of ensuring that courts routinely act inconformity with the adjudicative duty. The analysis reveals that previouscommentators’ concerns about the consequences of modifications to theappellate process are legitimate. When appellate adjudication more closelyresembled the idealized conception on which most critiques are based, italmost certainly generated consistent compliance with the adjudicativeduty. This was not simply because judges had more time. Instead, itresulted from a cluster of informal mechanisms that allowed for moreeffective monitoring of judicial behavior and otherwise worked todiscipline judges to fulfill their obligations.  Many of the changes to the15appellate process implemented over the last several decades have removedor impeded the effectiveness of these mechanisms.  As a result,16reductions in workload alone are unlikely to restore much of what hasbeen lost.Such a realization accordingly invites consideration of different meansto reform. This Article focuses on the judicial opinion. Specifically, ittakes up an account of the opinion as an example of informationalregulation, a term used to describe regulatory processes that operatethrough the required disclosure of information rather than through moretraditional command-and-control mechanisms.  The core insight17underlying informational regulation is that the audience for the disclosurewill, by virtue of being better informed, be better positioned to act inresponse to the disclosing entity’s conduct, and therefore to shape thatconduct through either market or political channels. At the same time, tothe extent that gathering and preparing the information for disclosure leadsthe disclosing entity to consider new information or to process in adifferent way information it already possessed, a disclosure requirementcan also have more direct effects on the underlying conduct.A moment’s reflection reveals that, although the connection has neverbeen expressly made, judicial opinions serve as a form of informationalregulation of judicial behavior. By disclosing the ostensible justificationsfor a court’s decision, an opinion enables the various audiences to whichit is directed to monitor the court’s performance and act in response to it.18At the same time, the act of writing an opinion disciplines the court to
748 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
19. See infra Part IV.B.3.20. See infra Part V.
reach, or at least justify, its decision in a more systematic, logical way thanwould be the case were judicial decisions rendered in a less formalmanner.  These points are at least implicit in the literature concerning the19forms and functions of opinions. Analysis of opinions in light of thedeveloping literature on informational regulation, however, allows formore refined consideration of how opinions work to shape judicialbehavior, and how today’s modified appellate process renders them lesseffective in doing so. That, in turn, provides a basis on which to developrefinements to the opinion device that direct adjudication toward greatercompliance with the adjudicative duty.This Article advocates one such refinement. Specifically, it suggeststhat the opinion format be modified to include “framingarguments”—party-generated statements of the issues before the court.20The inclusion of framing arguments would better harness theinformational-regulatory power of the judicial opinion to steer judicialbehavior toward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty. Judgesrequired to justify their decisions in the shadow of the parties’characterizations of the dispute before the court would be more likely notonly to justify, but also to reach those decisions in an appropriatelyresponsive manner. At the same time, the various audiences to whichopinions are directed could more easily monitor the extent to whichjudicial decisions meet the requirements of the adjudicative duty. In short,while not a cure-all, the use of framing arguments would better align theinformational-regulatory aspects of opinions with the overall goals of theregulatory regime.The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a briefoverview of the dominant models of American adjudication, extracts fromthem a conception of the adjudicative duty, and outlines what the dutydemands from judges. Part III explores the traditional constraints thatoperated to encourage compliance with the adjudicative duty in theappellate context and their demise in the wake of the growth of appellatecaseloads and procedural changes undertaken to cope with that growth.Part IV develops a conception of judicial opinions as informationalregulation, drawing on the developing literature concerning informationalregulation as well as that relating to the forms and functions of judicialopinions. Finally, Part V introduces the concept of framing arguments andoutlines how the implementation of such a device would operate to bringadjudication back toward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty.
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21. As Thomas Baker notes in his comprehensive study of the federal appellate courts:[T]here is an argument to be made that the most relevant enterprise in courtreform is to articulate how the ideal court system would function. . . . This is theessential purpose of theory: to further the understanding of the contemporaryreality; to assist in choosing among different futures; to begin to appreciate theuncertainties among the choices; and to come to realize the limits on the powerto choose.THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OFAPPEALS 27 (1994).22. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-38(1975); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.301, 303-06 (1989).23. See Scott, supra note 22, at 938-49; Sward, supra note 22, at 306-08.
II.  DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM: THE ELEMENTS OF THEADJUDICATIVE DUTYAny assessment of institutional design and function requiresconsideration of institutional purpose.  In the case of American civil21adjudication there are two acknowledged, fundamental purposes. The firstis providing a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes.  The22second is the creation and refinement of legal standards to be used as rulesby which disputes are resolved, and by which members of society canalign their future conduct.  These goals stand in tension with one another.23Fulfillment of the dispute resolution function does not require, and may behindered by, a focus extending beyond the precise dispute before the court.But because our system of precedent obligates a court to resolve futurecases in a manner consistent with its resolution of a present case, a courtmay find it difficult to resolve a given present case in an appropriatemanner without undesirably restricting its decisional options in futurecases. A court may accordingly face incentives toward what might becharacterized as “judicial inactivism.” That is, a court might prefer not toconfront a claim the resolution of which it fears might cause futuredifficulties by creating a troublesome precedent, or as to which it mighthave to reach a result that it considers distasteful but which is nonethelesscompelled by existing law. In these situations the court might, in effect,decide not to decide by attempting to avoid the claim altogether or torecharacterize the dispute between the parties so as to gloss over itstroublesome aspects. One can also imagine such a failure to decide havingless sinister origins. Judicial inactivism might simply result frominattention or inadvertence. As judges have faced ever-growing caseloads,and consequently have to supervise ever-growing staffs, the opportunitiesfor things to “fall through the cracks” undoubtedly have also increased.Whether intended or not, such conduct seems incompatible with
750 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
24. Judge Posner recently observed:I have had the experience—I think all judges have—that sometimes when I startto work on a case I am uncertain how it should be decided—it seems a toss-up. YetI have to decide (the duty to decide is the primary judicial duty), and the longerI work on the case, the more comfortable I become with my decision.Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L.REV. 31, 56 (2005) (emphasis added); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUSBRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 173 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that courts ofgeneral jurisdiction must “resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternativeis chaos”); Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in theFederal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 716, 732 (2001) (suggesting that the federalcourts of appeals lack a general ability to avoid adjudicating the claims brought before them).25. See Oldfather, supra note 5.26. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1985) (categorizing theories of adjudication based on the relativeprominence each assigns to the dispute resolution and law declaration functions).
prevailing notions of the judicial role, in which courts are obligated toresolve the matters brought before them regardless of the consequences ofdoing so.  But perhaps these notions are misguided. Perhaps, the public24and parties’ expectations to the contrary, courts may properly elect not todecide. This Part seeks to address the question whether (and if so, when)courts enjoy an inherent ability to avoid their decisional responsibilities,and, more generally, to determine what those responsibilities are.  In25undertaking that task I first discuss the dominant theoretical conceptionsof American adjudication in an effort to gain a somewhat more refinedsense of what adjudication is meant to accomplish and what mechanismsare critical to its doing so. Although these models exhibit importantdifferences both descriptively and normatively, they share significantcommonalities which bear on the resolution of these issues. I next draw onthese commonalities to articulate what I have called the “adjudicativeduty”—the minimal components of legitimate adjudication. Arguablythen, “judicial inactivism” consists of the failure to satisfy this duty.A.  An Overview of the Dominant Models of AdjudicationThe tension between the dispute resolution and law declarationfunctions of courts accounts for much of the variance among theconceptions of adjudication that have been formulated over the years.26These conceptions fall into two primary categories. The first is embodiedin the “classic” model of adjudication, which places relatively greateremphasis on dispute resolution. The second underlies the “public law”model, which subordinates resolution of the precise dispute before thecourt to the formulation and implementation of norms in the interest of
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27. For example, although mass tort litigation is often treated or characterized as simply avariant of public law litigation, there are significant differences between the two that make the lattera poor template for the former. See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 426-29 (1999)(identifying seven significant distinctions between mass tort litigation and public law litigation asconceived by the model). For other works articulating alternative models of adjudication, or someportion of the process of litigation, see, for example, Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.L. REV. 376, 378-80 (1982); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89GEO. L.J. 371, 372 (2001); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The BigCase and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1016-17 (2004).28. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Ofcourse, as Robert Bone has pointed out, Fuller’s model is not the pure dispute resolution model itis often portrayed to be. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the FalseDichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV.1273, 1275 (1995) (arguing not only that Fuller’s theory is not an embodiment of the disputeresolution model, but that it more closely resembles the public law model).29. See Fuller, supra note 28, at 364.30. Id. (“Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts adjudication towardits optimum expression. Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrityof adjudication itself.”).31. Id. at 366-67.32. Id. at 388.33. Id.
society more generally. These differing emphases lead to distinctconceptions of the judicial role. While the classic and public law modelsare not the only models of adjudication, and cannot fully explain the entirepresent universe of adjudication,  they nonetheless remain the dominant27conceptions, and the most fully developed.1.  The Classic ModelPerhaps the most prominent formulation of the classic model is LonFuller’s. In his classic article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,28Fuller argues that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies inthe fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participationin the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for adecision in his favor.”  For Fuller, then, the key to adjudicative legitimacy29is enhancing party participation.  This necessarily leads not merely to a30judicial orientation toward the dispute between the parties, but toward thatdispute as the parties have characterized it. This in turn requires not onlythat judicial decisions must “meet the test of reason,”  but also that they31should strive to reach those decisions on the grounds argued by theparties.  If a court fails to do so, Fuller argues, “then the adjudicative32process has become a sham, for the parties’ participation in the decisionhas lost all meaning.”  Fuller’s emphasis on participation likewise leads33him to advocate the issuance of opinions articulating the reasons behind
752 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
34. Id. at 387-88.35. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process:An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 411-12 (1978).36. Id. at 411.37. Id. at 412.38. Id.39. Id.40. Id.41. See id. at 412-13.42. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,1284 (1976).43. Id. at 1283-84. As Chayes put it, much of this litigation is “recognizable as a lawsuit onlybecause it takes place in a courtroom before an official called a judge.” Id. at 1302.44. Id. at 1284.
the decision, which give the parties assurance that their participation wasmeaningful to the decision and thus are generally necessary to ensure theparties and the public that the process is functioning as it should.34Melvin Eisenberg suggests that three norms emerge from Fuller’sconceptualization.  First, courts should “attend to what the parties have35to say.”  Only by gaining an understanding of the parties’ arguments can36the court fully honor their participation.  Second, an adjudicator should37“explain his decision in a manner that provides a substantive reply to whatthe parties have to say.”  Judicial opinions, on this view, are important38primarily because they reassure the parties that their participation wasmeaningful.  Third, a court’s decision should “be strongly responsive to39the parties’ proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed fromand be congruent with those proofs and arguments.”  This means not only40that judicial decisions should rest, to as great an extent as possible, on thegrounds argued by the parties, but also that the judicial role more generallyshould involve a reactive rather than proactive stance.  A proactive judge41might form preconceptions about what is important in a case, and therebyreduce the significance of party participation.2.  The Public Law ModelThe “public law” model was initially introduced by Abram Chayes inhis seminal article The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.  The42model grew out of the reality that much of the activity taking place incourts at the time Chayes wrote bore little resemblance to litigation asenvisioned by the classic model.  Rather than private parties squaring off43over the application of private rights, public law litigation in itsprototypical sense involves groups of plaintiffs seeking to enforceconstitutional or statutory rights against a governmental entity.  The44paradigm case under the classic model is a tort or contract suit between
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45. See id. at 1285.46. Id. at 1284.47. Id. at 1302.48. Id.49. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979).50. Id.51. Id. at 26-27. As Chayes described it, “The judge is the dominant figure in organizing andguiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a widerange of outsiders—masters, experts, and oversight personnel.” Chayes, supra note 42, at 1284.
two private parties.  Under the public law model, the paradigmatic case45involves an effort to reform an institution, such as to desegregate a schoolsystem or improve prison conditions.  Differences in the very nature of46these disputes necessarily lead to operational differences in the judicialrole. The inquiry in a typical private dispute under the classic model isfocused and retrospective. The questions involve concerns such as whathappened, whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, and whetherthe parties satisfied their contractual obligations. In a public law case, bycontrast, the inquiry is more prospective and predictive. Rather thandetermining the appropriate amount of compensation for a past injury, thecourt must fashion a remedy to be implemented on an ongoing basis. Suchremedies are “forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadlyremedial lines,”  and consequently require continual judicial involvement47over the course of their administration.48Another important distinction between adjudication under the twomodels lies in the degree to which courts can and should rely on the partiesto characterize and limit the contours of the dispute. For instance, if thelitigants in a contract dispute should happen to mischaracterize the natureof their dispute or overlook important facts or doctrine, the consequencesfall almost entirely on them. In contrast, public law cases often have directimplications for people and entities who may not be parties to the lawsuit.The named plaintiff or plaintiffs may only constitute a portion of thosewho will be affected by the outcome of the litigation, and some of thoseaffected might have interests and concerns that diverge from theplaintiff’s.  Alternatively, the named plaintiff’s view of the problem may49lead her to bring the suit against different or fewer defendants than mightother potentially affected parties.  Either eventuality leads to a situation50in which the appropriate interests, conceived of as those that will beaffected by the outcome of the litigation, are not before the court. Thisrequires the judge in public law litigation to be more proactive in order toensure that all relevant viewpoints are represented. It may, for example,require the judge to “construct a broader representational framework” byinvolving more parties in the litigation, as well as procuring the assistanceof special masters and experts.  In either case, the judge must depart from51
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52. There are at least three possibilities. The first is that the models relate to distinctphenomena. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 149-50. On this view, the classic model may stillrepresent the ideal in the context of traditional disputes between private parties over private rights,with the modifications to the adjudicative role associated with the public law model beingappropriate in cases sharing some or all of the key features of institutional reform litigation. Id. at150. If this is so, then the answer to the question of whether a particular feature of adjudication isnormatively desirable will often depend on the type of litigation in which the feature is employed.The second possibility is that the emergence of the public law model represented not merely alimited evolution of the adjudicative mechanism to account for discrete types of litigation, butrather was symptomatic of a more fundamental shift in the nature of the judicial role. Id. at 150-51.Whether in connection with a generalized increase in the role of government in society, see Chayes,supra note 42, at 1288, or a more nuanced appreciation of the effects of litigation on non-parties,the orientation of the judicial role might have changed to require a focus extending well beyond theimmediate parties even in what appear to be purely private disputes. Indeed, Owen Fiss, who wasas instrumental as Chayes in the articulation and development of the public law model, insists thatwas always accurate as an account of adjudication’s aims. See Fiss, supra note 49, at 29. As he putsit: “[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.” Id. Under thisview, the classic model would be at worst a relic of an earlier time, and at best something of anemasculated default model, whose prescriptions would hold only where not supplanted by thepublic law position to which the system has evolved. A third possibility is that both the models andthe features of adjudication they describe are interrelated. Oldfather, supra note 5, at 151-52.Neither, standing alone, may fully capture the essential nature of adjudication so much as highlightits alternative, conflicting aspects. As Meir Dan-Cohen puts this view: “Far from being descriptiveor normative alternatives, the two models are complementary, representing adjudication as a Janus-faced institution. In conjunction, the two models reflect a view of the judicial process as ridden withtension.” Dan-Cohen, supra note 26, at 5.53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.54. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
the norm of strong responsiveness to make up for these deficiencies.B.  The Models’ Common Conception of the Adjudicative DutyThese are very different conceptions of the judicial role, and one mightreasonably question whether it is possible to extract  from them anyconsistent vision of courts’ adjudicative responsibilities. Indeed, therelationship between the classic and public law models—in both itsdescriptive and normative senses—is unclear.  Yet the debate surrounding52the models obscures important commonalities. Despite their differences,the models share a basic understanding of courts’ minimal obligations.The most significant feature of this common ground is the value thateach model places on party participation. While Fuller’s version of theclassic model makes participation its centerpiece,  the public law53literature’s emphasis on the possibility that the parties will often fail torepresent (or misrepresent) the interests of everyone who will be affectedby litigation  obscures the fact that party participation remains critical to54the proper functioning of the adjudicative process even under the publiclaw model. This is so for two reasons. First, participation has significant
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55. See Fiss, supra note 49, at 29-30; Chayes, supra note 42, at 1308.56. See Chayes, supra note 42, at 1308-09.57. Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 412.58. Oldfather, supra note 5, at 168.
instrumental value. The parties, simply because they want to win, have anincentive to present the strongest case they can, and will typically be in thebest position to bring developed arguments and pertinent information tothe court.  While the representational deficiencies inherent in public law55litigation may render these arguments and information incomplete, theparties nonetheless remain best situated to provide the court with theinputs it needs. An adjudicative process that consistently fails to credit thisparticipation will not only discourage those in the best position to provideinformation from doing so, but may ultimately result in the demise of theadjudicative mechanism itself by leading those who would otherwise bringsuit to seek redress through alternative channels, or perhaps to abandontheir grievances entirely. Second, participation may have inherent orsymbolic value. As Chayes suggests, participation may stand as a good inits own right by helping to justify judicial, as opposed to political,involvement in public law matters.56Consideration of the models’ commonalities in light of the largerdispute resolution and law declaration functions of adjudication allows forformulation of the basic contours of the adjudicative duty. Briefly stated,courts must (at a minimum) decide the claims presented by the parties ina “weakly responsive” manner. Recall that Eisenberg characterizesFuller’s model as calling for “strongly responsive” decisions, meaningdecisions that “proceed from and [are] congruent with [the parties’] proofsand arguments.”  “Weak responsiveness, in contrast,” describes an57obligation to attend to the parties’ proofs and arguments—to gain anunderstanding of them and to bear them in mind during thedecisional process—but [does] not preclude the considerationof other information. A weakly responsive court could thusdecide a case on grounds of its own formulation, and itsobligation to the parties would be satisfied by giving dueconsideration to the parties’ arguments and reaching areasoned conclusion that those arguments do not provide anappropriate basis for resolution.58A court that is weakly responsive honors and rewards partyparticipation in accordance with the prescriptions of both the classic andpublic law models. Moreover, it must come to a full understanding of thedispute between the parties as they perceive it. Thus, weak responsiveness
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59. One could argue that adjudication is necessarily weakly responsive (and never stronglyresponsive) in this sense. That is, the parties will almost never share the same conception of theprecise nature of the dispute between them (otherwise they would likely not be before the court).Most cases will thus present situations in which “the claims which compete for judicialendorsement cannot . . . be commensurated without recharacterizing them in a way that alters theiressential meaning for the parties involved.” ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILINGIDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 340 (1993). In these situations, strong responsiveness mayrepresent only an unachievable ideal simply because it would be impossible for a court’s decisionto proceed from the proofs and arguments of both parties.60. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 173.61. See id. at 175.62. Id.63. See id. at 175-80.
preserves the crucial elements of the dispute resolution function.  At the59same time, weak responsiveness facilitates lawmaking at least insofar asthe court’s reasoning is reflected in an opinion. Even if a court concludesthat the parties have mischaracterized their dispute or have failed to fullyrepresent the full array of interests and considerations properly to beconsidered in resolving the issues presented, a court’s public engagementwith the parties’ arguments enhances understanding of what the law is byproviding information regarding what the law is not.  Put differently, a60court’s responsiveness to parties who the court concludes have missed thepoint has value from a lawmaking perspective because, for example, itsignals to future litigants that they should likewise not view their similardispute in the same way that the present parties incorrectly did.C.  Justification and ElaborationOf course, it is one thing to say that courts should go about the processof adjudication in a certain way, and another to ensure that they actuallydo so. Much of adjudication involves processes that are purely mental, andthus hidden from scrutiny. Because we cannot directly monitor or controlan important component of the adjudicative process, we must rely onsecondary mechanisms to shape judicial conduct. Some of these areinformal. As the next Part explores, traditionally a combination ofstructural and other institutional features has operated to produce at leastrough compliance with the adjudicative duty. Other constraints are moreformal, including the most prominent device for monitoring courts—thejudicial opinion.61Nearly all of the information available to the public concerning theworkings of the judicial process comes in the form of judicial opinions.62This has a number of implications for the formulation of the adjudicativeduty.  First, it suggests that the fact that a court has reached its decision63in a weakly responsive fashion may not be enough. In most cases, courtsshould provide public elaboration on the reasoning behind their decisional
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64. See id. at 175-77.65. Fuller suggests that elaboration is a preferred, though not essential, component ofadjudication for this reason. See Fuller, supra note 28, at 387-88; see also Oldfather, supra note 5,at 176 (discussing the implications of the classic model for the elaboration component of theadjudicative duty).66. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 176.67. See id. at 176-77.68. See id. at 155-60, 180. For more comprehensive discussions of judicial candor, seegenerally Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995)(rejecting a strict requirement of candor in support of judicial discretion in order to ultimatelypreserve institutional legitimacy); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.REV. 731 (1987) (discussing the relationship between scholarship and adjudication which leads tothe justification of less judicial candor to promote other goals).69. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353,401-02 (1989) (“[T]he unspoken premise for almost all of the prior calls for candor, is thatdeception in judging undermines the integrity of the judiciary. The almost universal condemnationof lying suggests that those who call for judicial candor have staked out the moral high ground.”(footnotes omitted)). 70. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 155-56.
processes.  Only then can the parties be certain that their participation was64meaningful, in the sense that the court’s decision was at least weaklyresponsive to their arguments.  Elaboration is likewise strongly preferred65under the public law model’s conception of adjudication as extending tomatters beyond the simple resolution of a dispute between the partiesbefore the court.  Whether the paramount aim is to guide the development66of the law, give meaning to public values, or govern ongoing relationsbetween a class of plaintiffs and a governmental institution, someelaboration on the justifications for a court’s decision is critical tofulfillment of the judicial function.  Second, it suggests the need for67judicial candor. That is, when courts do provide such elaboration, thereasons they give for their decisions should, to as great an extent as ispracticable, be the “real” reasons for the decision.  Even aside from the68basic ethical point that lying is bad, and perhaps particularly so whenengaged in by the branch of government responsible for interpreting thelaw,  there are instrumental justifications for a candor requirement.69Effective monitoring of the judiciary and effective maintenance of thesystem of precedent depend on knowing why courts act as they do. Onlywith this knowledge can the public and other branches of governmentassess the appropriateness of the courts’ reasoning, and take appropriatesteps in response.  The ability of private actors to structure their affairs in70accordance with the law likewise depends on knowing that courts willresolve disputes in accordance with publicly stated legal standards ratherthan some other unarticulated criteria.
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71. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 33 (1941) (“The bargenerally and with much reason feel it important that the reasons of every decision of consequencein our highest courts be set forth fully in written opinions, accessible to the profession and thepublic and that the courts should pronounce definitely upon every point raised by counsel, even ifno more than to state it and declare it irrelevant.”).
D.  The Adjudicative Duty SummarizedThis brief consideration of the dominant models of adjudication in theAmerican system reveals a common, consistent conception of the minimalcomponents of legitimate adjudication. Courts must honor partyparticipation, but need not be constrained by its limits. While strongresponsiveness might be preferred, weak responsiveness is required. Acourt that failed to confront a claim or that resolved it by glossing over itstroublesome aspects has failed to satisfy its adjudicative duty. The dutyinstead requires the court to engage the parties’ arguments, and if itconcludes that those arguments do not provide the appropriate basis fordecision, it must base that conclusion on appropriate criteria. Absentcompelling circumstances, the court must also provide a candid publicstatement of the reasons behind its decision. Only then will it be evenremotely possible for the parties and the public to monitor whether theunderlying decisional process is consistent with the duty. None of this should strike those familiar with the American legalsystem as revolutionary. The value of elucidating the components of theadjudicative duty stems not from any prescriptions of behavior differentfrom what we intuitively expect courts to do, but rather in providing atheoretical grounding on which to base those intuitions. A court acting ina manner consistent with the adjudicative duty will look like a court doingwhat we have been conditioned to believe courts should do (and, onepresumes, actually do in nearly all their cases).  Thus an appellate court71faced with six contentions need not address more than one if that is all thatis necessary to dispose of the case. Nor, if resolution of all six contentionsis necessary, must the court treat each of the six to a lengthy discussion inits opinion. The court should both engage with the parties’ arguments andgive the appearance of having engaged with the parties’ arguments. Thisis, by and large, how most judicial opinions strive to portray the process,even if we suspect that it is at least occasionally an inaccurate portrayal.
  III.  TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON APPELLATE ADJUDICATION        AND THEIR DECLINEDespite this underlying consistency in our understanding of theminimal components of legitimate adjudication, as we shall soon see thereis no body of law that imposes on courts a set of obligations consistentwith the adjudicative duty. Perhaps because of the difficulties associated
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72. See generally Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1982) (discussing courts’ general reluctance to impose upon themselves arequirement to provide reasons for their decisions).73. See ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(1) (2004) (“A judgeshall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification isrequired.”).74. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
with enforcing such a legal requirement, we have instead relied on a set ofprocedural and informal constraints to discipline the judicial process. ThisPart begins by examining the law, such as it is, relating to the adjudicativeduty, and considering the enforcement difficulties that render courts’statements regarding their adjudicative obligations largely aspirational ifnot merely ornamental. It then outlines the traditional constraints arisingfrom institutional design that historically operated to discipline theappellate judicial process toward rough compliance with the adjudicativeduty. Finally, it considers how the process has developed away from itstraditional forms as appellate courts have struggled to cope with massiveincreases in their caseloads over the past half-century, and how thosechanges have affected courts’ satisfaction of the adjudicative duty.A.  Legal Standards and the Problems of EnforcementCourts tend, perhaps unsurprisingly, to be less than effusive indescribing their adjudicative obligations.  This is not to suggest that there72are no cases in which courts acknowledge the existence of such obligationsand speak to their content. There are such cases, although not many, andon the whole they recognize a set of adjudicative goals consistent withwhat I have outlined above. As we will see, however, these statements arelargely aspirational, in significant part because of the lack of effectiveremedies for denials of the “rights” to which they refer.What emerges from the relative handful of opinions speaking to thetopic of adjudicative obligations can be stated quite simply: Courts mustdecide cases over which they have jurisdiction.  As Chief Justice Marshall73put it in Cohens v. Virginia:With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case maybe attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. Wehave no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdictionwhich is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The oneor the other would be treason to the constitution. Questionsmay occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannotavoid them.74While all of this sounds promising, Cohens and cases making similar
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75. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980) (discussing the history ofthe rule of necessity); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Hawkins, 775 So. 2d 101, 104-05 (Miss. 2000)(McRae, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens and surveying cases adopting the rule of necessity);Betensky v. Opcon Assocs., Inc., 738 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“Given the factthat courts have an institutional obligation to hear and decide the cases brought before them, thecommon law long ago created what is referred to in judicial disqualification cases as the rule ofnecessity. Stated succinctly, the rule of necessity is that if everyone is disqualified, no one isdisqualified. Thus, in a judicial salary case, where all judges by definition have an interest in theoutcome of the case, the judge assigned the case has a duty to hear and decide the case, howeverdisagreeable that task might be.”). There is likewise relatively little case law relating to Canon3(B)(1) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See ABA, Annotated Model Code, supra note 73,at 87-88.76. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. “When an issue or claim is properly beforethe court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but ratherretains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). The Supreme Court has justified thisas necessary to ensure that the parties do not have the ability through either inadvertence orcollusion to frame the claims in such a way that any opinion strongly responsive to the parties’arguments would be of dubious legal provenance. See U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents ofAm., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993). Such an opinion would not only be of questionableprecedential effect, but would also introduce an element of confusion into related bodies of law.77. For recent overviews and criticisms of this practice, see generally Adam A. Milani &Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate Courts, 69TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002) (rejecting the use of sua sponte decisions because it undermines dueprocess, the adversary process, and constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion); Barry A. Miller, SuaSponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SANDIEGO L. REV. 1253 (2002) (discussing the inconsistent manner in which appellate courts raiseissues sua sponte, and its implications on due process and the adversarial system).
statements are more aberrational than they are emblematic of a body oflaw relating to the adjudicative duty. Cohens, for example, is typicallycited in support of the “doctrine of necessity” in cases of judicialdisqualification rather than as the bedrock of a broadly applicable duty.75Further examination reveals that, even if Cohens and its progeny are takento support an adjudicative duty, that duty is rather flexible. It is clear, forexample, that appellate courts operate under no obligation to be stronglyresponsive in Fuller’s sense of generating decisions constrained by theproofs and arguments of the parties.  Indeed, any suggestion to the76contrary must confront the fact that courts routinely engage in sua spontedecision making. In such cases a court might reach a decision based notmerely on a different understanding of a claim asserted by the parties, butrather based on a “claim” that the parties did not raise at all.  77One can tell a similar story with respect to judicial statements thatappear to mandate something akin to weak responsiveness. For example,within the past decade two federal appellate courts have endorsed theproposition that a litigant has a “right to have all issues fully considered
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78. United States v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Bernklau v. Principi,291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Garza).79. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 548 (2d ed. 1996) (suggestingthat “the judicial resolution of a legal dispute implicates two separate processes: (1) deciding, orthe process of discovering the conclusion, and (2) justifying, or the process of public exposition ofthat conclusion.”). This view is not universally held. See David McGowan, Judicial Writing andthe Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 513 (2001) (asserting “that thepremise that judicial writing can be divorced from deciding or other aspects of judging is wrong”);see also Oldfather, supra note 5, at 175-80 (contrasting a view of elaboration as evidence ofadjudicative behavior with a view of adjudication as an integral part of adjudicative behavior).80. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (per curiam).81. See Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1983) (“There is no requirementin law that a federal appellate court’s decision be accompanied by a written opinion.”); see alsoDAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 33.2 (4th ed. 2000).82. One recent case, however, suggests that there is some minimal requirement ofresponsiveness once a court decides to issue an opinion. See Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380F.3d 729, 731-32 (3d Cir. 2004). In Bright v. Westmoreland County, the Third Circuit reversed andremanded for reconsideration a district court order and opinion that had been prepared by one ofthe parties and adopted by the district court with little modification. See id. at 731. The courtobserved that:[J]udicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. . . . They are tangibleproof to the litigants that the judge actively wrestled with their claims andarguments and made a scholarly decision based on his or her own reason andlogic. When a court adopts a party’s proposed opinion as its own, the court vitiatesthe vital purposes served by judicial opinions.Id. at 732. The court went on to note that it found the case before it especially troubling given thelack of any evidence that the court’s decision was its own:In this case, there is no record evidence which would allow us to conclude that theDistrict Court conducted its own independent review, or that the opinion is theproduct of its own judgment. In fact, the procedure used by the District Courtcasts doubt on the possibility of such a conclusion.Id. Noting that this, in turn, casts doubt on the legitimacy of the adjudicative process, the courtcategorically disapproved of the practice. See also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 174 (2005).
and ruled on by the appellate court” to which the litigant presents them.78This may be so, but it seems clear that if it is, the court’s obligation ismeant to extend only to the process of making a decision and not the(arguably) distinct process of justifying that decision.  Simply put, weak79responsiveness is not a universal feature of judicial opinions. Indeed, theSupreme Court has vested the federal courts of appeals with “wide latitudein their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.”  As a80consequence, not only do the parties to federal litigation have noentitlement to any opinion at all,  they have no right to expect that the81court will speak to all their arguments in the event it elects to issuean opinion.  The picture is largely the same in the state courts of82
762 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
83. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 171 (2005) (“Except as required by provisions of stateconstitutions, statutes, or court rules, opinions need not be written by the court or judge, althoughthe matter rests in the judicial discretion, as a result of which opinions will be written whennecessary.”).84. See, e.g., B.E.T., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 499 A.2d 811, 811 (Del. 1985) (per curiam)(rejecting a lower court’s adoption of the brief of one of the parties as the opinion of the court ascontrary to Delaware’s requirement that courts provide reasons for their decisions); People v.Garcia, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (articulating the contours of the CaliforniaConstitution’s requirement “that appellate opinions state the reasons for the disposition”).85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sluss v. Appellate Court of Ind., 17 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1938)(noting that it would not presume that the framers of the Indiana Constitution “intended that thiscourt should be required to exhaust every subject that might be raised on an appeal, without regardto its importance in the determination of the cause”).86. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.87. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 87-88 (1990).88. In re Balfour MacLaine Intern., Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 1996); see also UnitedStates v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995).89. David McGowan, who advocates the adoption of ethical rules requiring judges to writecandidly and in such a manner as to resolve the dispute actually before them, recognizes thisproblem. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 599-600. Allowing that such rules would be difficult toenforce, he nonetheless suggests that they would have an effect, offering “a sort of shamingargument—we enact rules so judges will feel guilty and unjudicial if they do not follow them.” Id.at 600.90. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 157.
appeals.  Although some states by constitution or statute require that their83courts provide reasons for their decisions,  even such provisions are not84interpreted to require exhaustive consideration of all the parties’contentions.  All of this is manifest in the courts’ output. Appellate courts85routinely dispose of cases via truncated “unpublished” decisions orminimalistic judgment orders that merely state the result,  and even full86opinions frequently conclude with a so-called “cleanup phrase”  along the87lines of “[w]e have considered the remaining issues raised by [appellant],and find them to be without merit.”88The flexibility that courts enjoy in their decisions of whether and howto write opinions underscores a fundamental difficulty with any effort toimplement an adjudicative duty rooted in Cohens and similar cases—namely, the lack of effective mechanisms for detection of violations andenforcement of the duty.  Consider a case in which a party believes that89an appellate court failed to satisfy its obligations in its treatment of a case.Although appellate panels can grant rehearings, the panel rehearing devicehas generally fallen into disuse,  and in any event a panel that violated the90adjudicative duty is unlikely to be receptive to a petition for rehearing onthose grounds. En banc review and the grant of discretionary review by asupreme court are equally unlikely. Both events are so rare that, purely asa statistical matter, the likelihood of intervention by a subsequent judicial
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91. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 83 n.23 (noting that the Supreme Court granted review ina mere 1.47% of the cases in which petitions for certiorari were filed in 1993); Tracey E. George,The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213,214 (1999) (“Circuit courts rarely invoke the en banc procedure; courts of appeals resolve fewerthan one percent of their cases en banc.”); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making andthe Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.235, 252-53 (1991) (noting the weakness of external constraints on appellate court decisionmaking).92. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,Summer 1998, at 157, 166 (noting that, in the case of judgment orders, “[t]he fact that no law wasmade also makes it unlikely that either the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court will grantreview.”); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMSIN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 357 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, eds.,The Foundation Press Inc. 1994) (1958) (noting that, in the case of trial court decisions stated onlyas conclusions, “an appellate court will have trouble in reviewing the decision to decide whetheror not it involves error, unless it retraces the whole process of decision de novo”).93. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THEUNITED STATES 26 (1994).94. En banc review is used primarily to police doctrinal uniformity within a court. SeeROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 459-65 (2d ed. 1989) (discussingthe use of and practices related to en banc review); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the FederalCourts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805,808-19 (1993) (discussing the history of en banc review).95. Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (quoting Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340(Fed. Cir. 2001)).96. Butler, 244 F.3d at 1340.
body in any given case is small.  This would be particularly so in the case91of a request based on a violation of the adjudicative duty, where the verybasis for the assertion that further review is necessary is not that somethingwas done incorrectly in the prior proceeding but rather that something wasnot done at all.  A justice considering whether to grant discretionary92review in the ordinary case can often get a good sense of whether to do sosimply from reading the lower court’s opinion. If that opinion reflectsreasoning that the justice finds troublesome, she will be more likely tovote to review. If, on the other hand, the need for review is alleged to arisefrom the lower court’s failure to address an issue, the justice’s task is moredifficult. Now she must put herself in the place of the lower court andattempt to replicate its analysis. This is not only difficult, but alsosomething that the justice likely views as outside the core function of hercourt, which is to oversee the development of the law.  A lower court’s93failure to speak to a claim does not implicate this function. Since it hassaid nothing on the issue, the lower court’s inaction has no impact on thecontent of the law. A similar analysis holds in the case of en banc review.94Consistent with all of this, courts have held themselves entitled to a“presumption of regularity,”  pursuant to which judges are to assume that95other courts “have properly discharged their official duties”  absent clear96
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97. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir. 1970)(“The Court itself must be vigilant. We believe we are sensitive now to the factors which wouldmake application of the Rule [allowing judgment orders in certain circumstances] wrong or unwiseor inappropriate. It is the Court’s purpose to heed them and in our own survival assure survival ofthe system we cherish.”); see also United States v. Baynes, 548 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1977) (percuriam) (quoting same).98. I do not want to overstate the empirical claim I make here. I do not mean to suggest thatI have established that these informal constraints forced courts to comply with the adjudicative dutyin any strict sense, or even that it would be possible to do so. As Judge Posner has noted, it isnotoriously difficult to assess whether a judiciary is producing the desired level of justice, evenwere we able to agree on what such a concept would entail. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMINGLAW 114-15 (1995). As a consequence, we rely on proxies, such as stringent prohibitions againstcreating even the appearance of bias, id., and on the types of internal monitoring and informalsanctions outlined in this Part, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDINGAPPEALS 19-51 (1960) (articulating and discussing fourteen “major steadying factors” in thecontext of appellate adjudication). These proxies and sanctions ultimately result in a process thatgenerates adjudication consistent with the ideal. As Reynolds and Richman explain:Full appellate procedure produces benefits beyond insuring correct outcomes byproviding visibility, accountability, and reviewability in ways that truncatedprocedures cannot. In particular, oral argument and published opinions reassurelitigants, particularly those most inclined to distrust government officials, that thejudges themselves have carefully considered their appeals. Moreover, selectivedistribution of full appellate procedure decreases confidence in the legal system,and it causes many to suspect that the law has in fact become a “respecter ofpersons” and that the judges are not providing equal justice to poor and rich alike.William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 1290, 1291-92 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
evidence to the contrary.Ultimately, then, what at first appear to be statements of a legal dutyto go about the process of adjudication in a certain way amount to littlemore than incantations designed to assure the public, and perhaps thejudges themselves, that those responsible for adjudication understand whattheir obligations entail. Indeed, courts occasionally suggest that their senseof responsibility and awareness of what is at stake provides the mostmeaningful barrier against the abuses to which the process is subject.  97B.  The Traditional Appellate Process and Informal Constraints         on Adjudication        Despite the lack of formal, legal requirements that courts satisfy theadjudicative duty, appellate courts have historically generated decisionsin a manner generally compliant with the duty.  This is a product of the98informal constraints imposed by the processes and conditions under whichappellate adjudication has traditionally taken place. These conditions arereflected in the widely shared understanding of what the idealized
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99. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the NewCertiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 278 (1996)(describing what they call “the Learned Hand model” of appellate judging). For similar depictionsof an idealized conception of appellate adjudication, see COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVESFOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 70 (1998) (describing the assumedcomponents of the right to appeal prior to the 1960s); BAKER, supra note 21, at 14-17; PAUL D.CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 14-16 (1976) (describing “the appellate process whenleisure prevails”). But see Posner, supra note 24, at 66 (suggesting that appellate adjudication “isnot a protracted process unless the judge has difficulty making up his mind, which is apsychological trait rather than an index of conscientiousness”).100. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 278.101. Id.102. Id.103. See id.104. See id. at 278 n.14 (noting that “[a]lthough this ideal vision may never have beenperfectly followed, even on Learned Hand’s court, that court did come quite close to the ideal”).105. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.106. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 279 (“At one time, argument in a single casecould last several days.”).
appellate process looks like. In the archetypal appellate court,  each case99is resolved only through the direct, intense efforts of the judgesresponsible for its decision. The judges scrutinize the parties’ briefs, testthe parties’ contentions and their own initial impressions at oral argument,and reach a tentative resolution following a conference among themselvesimmediately following the argument.  Then, one of the judges prepares100a draft opinion and circulates it to the others.  They in turn review it101carefully, offering comments and suggestions which the authoring judgetakes into account in preparing a revised draft.  This continues until all102the judges are in agreement, at which point a final opinion is released forinclusion in the official reporter of the court’s decisions.103While this idealized form of adjudication may never have been ageneralized reality, it certainly once represented an achievable ideal.104This was a world of fewer cases, which in turn meant more time for thesort of contemplation that the model envisions. When every judge on apanel could devote full attention to every case, and when those judgesshared a consistent sense of their task,  weak responsiveness was105effectively guaranteed. What is more, the process incorporated variousbuilt-in checkpoints at which the obligation could be reinforced. Consider,for example, oral argument, which under the idealized version of theprocess occurs in every case, and for as long as is necessary for the partiesand the judges to fully explore the issues.  The process of argument not106only leads occasionally to changed minds and new perspectives, but alsoprovides the parties with another chance to press their view of the disputeon the court. If a judge’s thinking about a case has taken a turn away fromthe parties’ conception of the issues, counsel can suggest to the court why
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107. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 112-13 (discussing the “systemic costs of the lost oralargument”).108. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 161.109. See id. at 160-62.110. See id. at 42 (“The more judges there are in a court system, the less responsibly each canbe expected to exercise his power.”).111. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 29-30 (discussing the advantages of smaller courts); FRANK M. COFFIN, ONAPPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 213-29 (1994) (discussing the value of collegialityand the collegiality-inhibiting effects of the increased size of courts).112. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 29-30; COFFIN, supra note 111, at 216.113. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 98-99 (noting the expansion in the number and type offederal rights since the 1960s).
that turn is mistaken, and at least has an opportunity to participate relativeto this new theory.  Perhaps as significant to the argument’s contribution107to the quality of the decision-making process is the fact that the publicnature of the event creates an incentive for judges to come to a fullunderstanding of the case so as not to appear unprepared or incompetentbefore the public.  In addition, the nature of oral argument effectively108guarantees that the judges will focus their attention exclusively on the caseunder consideration for the full period of the argument.  And the entire109exercise provides the public with an opportunity to witness, and thereforemonitor, a portion of the court’s decisional process.Outside of argument, if one judge failed to give appropriate regard tothe parties’ contentions in either his consideration of the case or in thedrafting of an opinion, his fellow judges could be counted on to bring thematter to his attention. The fact that courts were smaller facilitated thisdynamic.  The judges on these smaller courts interacted frequently with110one another, and thereby came to know their colleagues well, bothpersonally and professionally.  They could accordingly hold their111colleagues more accountable individually, and themselves collectivelymore accountable as a court.  This was also a world of less law, both in112the sense that there were fewer cases, statutes, and regulations, and in thesense that there were fewer substantive areas of law.  A judge could be113expected to have more than a passing familiarity with the law in nearlyevery case that arose, and to be familiar with the latest cases and otherdevelopments. That likewise made it easier for judges on a court tomonitor the court’s decisional process simply because they were betterpositioned to spot opinions that failed to comport with applicablestandards. The bar could also play a more active role as a constraint, andnot only because of the greater opportunities it enjoyed to participate inargument. Just as the existence of fewer cases and less law enabled moreeffective monitoring by judges, so did it allow the bar to serve as a useful
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114. An interesting aspect of the history of unpublished opinions is that members of the barinitially advocated the practice on the grounds that the increasing output of appellate courts madeit difficult to stay abreast of the state of the law. See John P. Borger & Chad M. Oldfather,Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899,900-03 (2001).115. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 31-32 (noting that the process of group decision-making in the context of appellate courts tends to result in decisions with greater perspective andfewer extremes); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THEFEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 58-59 (1980) (noting the role of collegiality as a constraint ondecision-making).116. In Judge Coffin’s words:One reads a good brief from the appellant; the position seems reasonable. But agood brief from appellee, bolstered perhaps by a trial judge’s opinion, seemsincontrovertible. Discussion with the law clerks in chambers casts doubt on anytentative position. Any such doubt may be demolished by oral argument, only togive rise to a new bias, which in turn may be shaken by the postargumentconference among the judges. As research and writing reveal new problems, thetentative disposition of the panel of judges may appear wrong. The opinion iswritten and circulated, producing reactions from the other judges, which againchange the thrust, the rationale, or even the result. Only when the process hasended can one say that the decision has been made, after as many as seven turnsin the road. The guarantee of a judge’s impartiality lies not in suspendingjudgment throughout the process but in recognizing that each successive judgmentis tentative, fragile, and likely to be modified or set aside as a consequence ofdeepened insight. The non-lawyer looks on the judge as a model of decisiveness.The truth is more likely that the appellate judge in a difficult case is committed tothe unpleasant state of prolonged indecisiveness.COFFIN, supra note 115, at 63.
monitor. Lawyers as well could realistically expect to keep abreast of theentirety of a court’s output, such that an aberrational result could not beexpected to go unnoticed by the legal community.114All of this operated to create a sense of ownership of decisions in bothan individual and collective sense. When each judge was personallyengaged in the decision-making process throughout its course, fromreading the briefs to participating in oral argument to drafting andreviewing opinions, the work emerging from a judge’s chambers wasunquestionably that judge’s work. At the same time, each judge was ableto monitor the court’s output generally, and to participate in a meaningfulway in the decision-making process as to those cases in which she was notthe authoring judge.  In addition, the fact that it was a decision-making115process, as opposed to a mechanism designed to generate decisions withlittle opportunity for reflection, is significant. As Judge Coffin notes inlauding the virtues of what he calls “graduated decision-making,” theidealized appellate process provides at least seven opportunities for ajudge to reconsider her thinking on a case.  Reflection, reconsideration,116
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117. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 19-25.118. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 14 (“Over the last 100 years, filings per appellate judgeship have increased byalmost a factor of six. By contrast, filings per judgeship in the district courts have not evendoubled.”).119. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS2003 23 tbl.B-1 (2003) (showing 60,661 cases commenced in the courts of appeals), available athttp://uscourts.gov/library/statisticsalreports.html, with DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 210 tbl.B 1 (1961) (showing 3,899 cases commenced in the courtsof appeals). The statistics relating to appellate caseloads in the state courts are not as well-developed, but in general the same sort of upward trend is evident. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell,Is There An Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?, JUDGES’ J., Summer 1985, at 34, 36-37 (indicatingthat on average, state trial court filings are doubling about every fifteen to twenty years, and appealsare doubling each decade).120. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 14.121. See generally COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OFAPPEALS, supra note 99, at 17-25; BAKER, supra note 21, at 106-47; CARRINGTON, ET AL., supranote 99, at 13-41.
and refinement are built into the process. When coupled with judges whoare, in Karl Llewellyn’s phrasing, “law-conditioned” —that is, trained117in law and having long experience in the practice of law, and thereforeinclined to approach and resolve problems in a manner consistent with themores and expectations of the legal culture—the result is likely to beconsistent with the ideals that undergird the process.C.  The Crisis of Volume and the Weakening of Informal ConstraintsHowever realistic an account of appellate adjudication the idealizedconception might once have been, there is no disputing that it fails as anaccurate description of the process today. The primary cause for this is the“crisis of volume” afflicting the appellate courts.  The numbers are118staggering. The federal courts of appeals in 2003 faced more than fifteentimes as many cases as in 1960.  While the number of judges has119increased over this same period, expansion has not kept pace with thedockets. Appeals per judge have grown by some 450% over this sameperiod.  Whatever the historic ability of courts and judges to engage in120their work at a leisurely pace, present realities clearly do not allow forunhurried deliberation. Instead, the need to cope with growing caseloadshas led not only to more work for each judge, but also to a number of well-documented changes to the appellate process.  Many of these changes,121coupled with the pressures imposed by the need to keep pace with thedocket, have implications for courts’ tendency to satisfy the adjudicativeduty on a consistent basis.
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122. Twenty-five years ago Robert Leflar remarked on the effects of crowded dockets: “Ampletime for thoughtful consideration and reconsideration is scarce. All appeals must be decided, anddecisions must be turned out by the hundreds. In most, reliance upon past precedent or uponreasonable analogy to the precedent affords the only possible approach.” Robert A. Leflar, HonestJudicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 741 (1979).123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.124. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 14 tbl.2-3 (noting an increase from 88 judges in 1964 to 179 in 1997).125. See CARRINGTON, ET AL., supra note 99, at 4 (noting the trend in state appellate courts);MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 93, at 16-18. See generally Thomas B. Marvell, State AppellateCourt Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282 (1989) (chronicling the growth in stateappellate court caseloads and cataloging the varied responses thereto).126. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 74.127. Id.128. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 109-10; Cooper & Berman, supra note 24, at 700-01.
1.  Changes Affecting the Decision-Making ProcessAmong the most significant consequences of the steps courts havetaken to conserve judicial time and resources is that judges are less able toact as direct participants throughout the decision-making and opinion-generation process. To a large degree this is simply a function of havingmore cases and thus less time to devote to each one.  Time for leisurely122reflection is an assumed component of the idealized conception, alongwith the notion that more reflection will lead to better results. But leisureis no longer a feature of the appellate judicial process. The fifteen-foldincrease in the number of cases on the dockets of the federal courts ofappeals since 1960 has not been accompanied by a similar increase in thenumber of judges.  Instead, the number of appellate judges has roughly123doubled.  The picture is not so uniformly bleak in the state courts, where124many states have been able to address the problems of volume by addingan intermediate appellate court to what was previously a two-tiersystem.  But it is certainly true in the federal courts, and largely true in125the state courts, that each judge is responsible for considerably more casesthan was his counterpart a half-century ago. The average number ofpublished opinions authored by a federal appellate judge increased fromthirty-one in 1960 to fifty-four in 1994.  During that same period the126average number of cases terminated on the merits per active circuit judgeincreased from 40.6 to 187.9.127As these numbers suggest, the crisis in appellate dockets has long sincepassed the point where courts merely need to cut down on leisurelyreflection. Instead, the process itself has been modified at nearly everystage. Oral argument, once available in all cases and for expansiveamounts of time, is now restricted to short time periods in the fifty or sixtypercent of cases where it is available at all.  This not only deprives the128parties of a significant portion of their opportunity to participate, but also
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129. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. What is more, many appellate courtsfrequently dispense not only with argument, but also with any sort of conference among the judgesin nonargued cases, a practice Judge Posner describes as “insidious” and likely to create a“tendency to sign on the dotted line with little real consideration of the case . . . .” POSNER, supranote 11, at 162.130. Judge Posner reports:Today, most judicial opinions, including many Supreme Court opinions, areghostwritten by law clerks. Many appellate judges have never actually written ajudicial opinion. Some judges do extensive editing of their law clerks’ opiniondrafts, others not, and this is the pattern in the Supreme Court as well as in thelower courts.Posner, supra note 24, at 61; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 139-47; Cooper & Berman, supranote 24, at 697-99.131. POSNER, supra note 11, at 145-49.132. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 513-14.133. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 139-47 (discussing the role of staff attorneys); Reynolds& Richman, supra note 98, at 1290-92 (discussing the “truncated procedures” that have resultedfrom delegating judges’ work to staff attorneys).134. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 22.
removes both an obligation to focus exclusively on each case for a fixedperiod of time and an incentive to come to a full understanding of acase.  129The reduction of the judge’s role in the writing of opinions has beeneven greater. In stark contrast to the idealized conception, initial drafts ofappellate opinions today are almost exclusively prepared by law clerks.130This transformation of the judge from author to editor has likewiseresulted in a reduction in judicial engagement in the fundamental task ofdecision making. Opinions drafted by clerks tend to be different fromthose drafted by judges in terms of style, length, candor, level of researchand credibility.  More fundamentally, the act of writing both requires and131engenders a deeper level of engagement with the case.  However132engaged they might be, it seems indisputable that contemporary judges areless directly engaged with the cases they must decide than theirpredecessors. These effects are compounded by the increasing involvement of centralcourt staff in screening cases before they reach the judges.  The typical133screening mechanism leads to some portion of the docket remaining acandidate for a more traditional process, while the remainder of cases arechanneled toward settlement or truncated processes involving no oralargument and memorandum or order opinions, which are often drafted bystaff.  The cases on this latter track, by design, receive even less judicial134attention. Moreover, opinions drafted by staff attorneys are less apt to
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135. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 152.136. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.137. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.138. As Thomas Baker puts it:Stop to consider the implications from workload and the overall impact of thecoping mechanisms of intramural reforms. There are approximately 250 workingdays in a calendar year. In 1990, there were 40,898 appeals decided, a ratio of 247per judge or nearly one per day. But more significantly these figures yield a ratioof 787 appeals per 3-judge panel or a little more than three appeals “decided”every working day. And there are numerous other demands on a circuit judge that
approximate the point of view of the judge under whose name they werewritten as compared to those drafted by the judge’s personal law clerks.135Collectively, these developments have increased the distance betweenthe judge and the decisions the judge must make. Preparation for oralargument, participation in oral argument, and the writing of an opinioneach represent opportunities for the judge to spend time studying andanalyzing the claims presented in a case. Any opportunity to work with aproblem is likely to reveal wrinkles that may not have been immediatelyapparent, and to allow reconsideration of the fit between the problem andone’s initial sense of its appropriate resolution.  As resource constraints136and modified procedures render judges less able to do these things, theprocess of graduated decision-making becomes more and more a momentof decision made on the basis of a packaged distillation of informationprepared by others. As we will see, that in turn decreases the likelihoodthat courts will consistently satisfy their adjudicative duty.2.  Changes Affecting the Ability to MonitorJust as the crisis of volume and the procedural changes made in itswake have increased the distance between the judge and her own workproduct, so have they affected her relationship with her colleagues’ workproduct. Indeed, the statistics provided in the preceding section regardingincreased workload only tell a portion of the story.  The average circuit137judge today is not only responsible for considerably more opinions andother dispositions than her predecessor of several decades ago, but also forreviewing and commenting on roughly twice that many opinions writtenby other members of panels on which she serves, and presumably for ahandful of concurrences and dissents. Meanwhile, she must also payattention to the rest of the opinions issued by her court so as to remainabreast of developments in her jurisdiction, a task that has alsodramatically grown in size.This alone makes it difficult to adequately monitor all that takes placeon one’s court.  But there is another, less quantifiable aspect of the138
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regularly compete for time and attention. Are there three meaningful votes cast inevery federal appeal today? These ratios imply that a great deal of what todaypasses for a participation on the merits by an individual circuit judge really onlyamounts to rubber-stamping the work of a colleague, as opposed to the moretraditional full participation in collegial decisionmaking.BAKER, supra note 21, at 148.139. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 347. Because appellate courts sit in panels, any singlejudge’s desire to act in a manner inconsistent with prevailing norms will require, at the very least,the indifference of his colleagues in order to be put into effect. Because appellate courts tend tohave relatively few judges, any pattern of activity inconsistent with prevailing norms will becomeknown to all judges on the court. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 92, at 166-67. Moreover, thecourts’ small size renders informal social sanctions quite effective as constraints on behavior. Id.at 167. But there is reason to suspect that this mechanism, too, has become less effective than itmight once have been at enforcing the adjudicative duty.140. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATESCOURTS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2001), available athttp://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.
changes resulting from the crisis of volume. Not only is it the case thatincreased caseloads have made it more difficult for judges to monitor theoutput of their colleagues and their court, it may also be that the nature ofthe monitoring has changed in significant ways. In addition to being lessable to scrutinize their colleagues’ work, judges may be looking fordifferent things. Although the public aspects of the appellate processtypically receive the most attention as constraints on judicial behavior,informal court norms play a substantial role as well.  In other words,139even if judges are well-positioned to monitor one another, the monitoringwill be for violations of court norms, and sanctions will only be applied inthe case of such violations. And it may be that the norms themselves haveshifted as judges become more comfortable adjudicating large portions oftheir dockets in a manner that falls short of the idealized conception.Consider again the changes to the relationship between judges and theirdecisions explored in the preceding section. Judges have unquestionablybecome accustomed to delegating substantial portions of what werehistorically their responsibilities to others, and, in doing so, according alarge part of the cases on their dockets a level of adjudication that fallswell short of the idealized conception. Having come to expect less ofthemselves and their colleagues in these cases, there is no reason toconclude they might not have lowered their expectations more generally.Consideration of another change to the process of appellate adjudicationhelps make the point. Courts have adopted a practice of issuing differenttypes of opinions. While once all appeals were resolved by way of full,published opinions, the present practice is to resolve a substantial portionof appeals—nearly eighty percent in the federal courts —by way of so-140called unpublished opinions. Such opinions, which have been the subject
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141. See, e.g., Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004) (commenting on the detrimental effect of unpublished opinions onprecedent and the resulting unfairness to litigants); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: TheScandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (decrying thedestruction of precedent through unpublished opinions and addressing the power that judges—andby extension, law clerks and staff attorneys—can wield through their use); Lauren Robel, ThePractice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in anInterpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) (examining appellate courts’ nonpublicationpractices and non-citation rules in light of Anastasoff v. United States, an Eighth Circuit caseupholding the use of an unpublished opinion as precedent against a taxpayer); Michael B.W.Sinclair, Anastasoff versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying PrecedentialAuthority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (2003) (arguing that theconstitutionality and wisdom of nonpublication and non-citation rules depends on one’s conceptionof stare decisis, and suggesting the existence of a middle ground).142. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 24, at 702-03 (discussing the varying weight accordedto unpublished opinions by the federal circuits).143. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t AllowCitation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 44 (acknowledging that most ofthe Ninth Circuit’s unpublished memorandum dispositions are drafted by law clerks or staffattorneys and rarely edited by the judges).144. For a history and criticism of this practice in the federal courts, see BAKER, supra note21, at 121-25. Most state courts have an analogous procedure. See Kerri L. Klover, “OrderOpinions”—The Public’s Perception of Injustice, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1225, 1244-45 (1996).145. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456(1983). 
of a vast amount of commentary in recent years,  typically contain less141analysis and are often deemed to have less, if any, precedential value.142In many cases unpublished opinions are prepared by court staff andeffectively “rubber stamped” by the judges.  Not infrequently, the courts143dispense with opinions altogether, simply issuing an order indicating thatthe lower court disposition is affirmed.144These devices provide a ready mechanism for the avoidance of difficultor troubling claims, as well as an increased likelihood of the inadvertentoverlooking of such claims. A judge (who is, it bears repeating, a merehuman) is simply less likely to scrutinize an opinion from the chambers ofone of her colleagues that does not constitute precedent and which as aresult will never form the basis of arguments the judge must confront ina future case. If that opinion fails to be responsive to the parties’arguments, the judge is less likely to notice. What I have referred to as theincreased distance between a judge and her own decisions is likely tofacilitate this dynamic. As Owen Fiss notes in addressing the“bureaucratization” of the judiciary, judges’ increasing reliance on othersto perform portions of their tasks leads overall to a lessened sense ofresponsibility for the outputs of the process.  “The judge acts on the145assumption that his work is the product of ‘many hands,’ . . . [and that]
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146. Id. (footnote omitted).147. See POSNER, supra note 98, at 123.148. And, as Judge Posner reminds us, judges have as much aversion to this sort of “hassle”as anyone else. Id. at 124.149. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219,223 (1999).150. Id. David Law concludes from a statistical analysis of asylum cases decided by the NinthCircuit that:[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined: forexample, judges may be prepared to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary totheir own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the decisionremains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists uponpublication.David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the NinthCircuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005). See generally Evan H. Caminker, Sincere andStrategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (discussing thenormative dimensions of strategic voting).151. POSNER, supra note 11, at 165. Posner does not view this concern as dispositive of thequestion whether unpublished opinions are, on balance, useful. Id. at 168. At least one other judgehas used the rug metaphor. See Edward A. Adams, Increased Use of Unpublished OpinionsFaulted, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at 1, 4 (quoting Judge Wilfred Feinberg). Other judges haveacknowledged that strategic considerations at least occasionally play a role in the decision to usean unpublished opinion. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: WhatPredicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 97 n.84 (2001).152. She observes:
[t]he decision or opinion is not wholly his own.”146The availability of these devices also increases the possibility of moreknowing decisional failures. If one judge (or, as Judge Posner posits, eventhe law clerk of one of the judges) has a strong opinion as to how a caseshould be resolved, and the other judges are less interested in the case,they are likely to acquiesce to the opinionated judge.  Taking a stand in147opposition takes time, and may ultimately require drafting a dissenting orconcurring opinion, which consumes even more time.  This creates a148tendency to go along, which may be even greater where the resultingopinion creates no precedent. Indeed, Judge Richard Arnold suggests thatthe prevalent use of unpublished opinions has negative effects “on thepsychology of judging”  and creates a temptation for courts to utilize149them to “sweep[] the difficulties under the rug” in cases where applicablelegal standards appear to require an undesirable result.  Judge Posner150invokes the same imagery, suggesting that “the unpublished opinionprovides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues under the rug incases where a one-liner would be too blatant an evasion of judicialduty.”  Judge Patricia Wald attests that she has seen it happen.151 152
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I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decisionincorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming publicdebate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters goalong with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. Wedo occasionally sweep troublesome issues under the rug, though most will not stayput for long.Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
3.  Effects on Fulfillment of the Adjudicative DutyThe modified process typical of contemporary appellate adjudicationis certainly more conducive to breaches of the adjudicative duty than wasthe traditional process. Judicial decisions are less likely nowadays to beeven weakly responsive to the parties’ proofs and arguments simplybecause there are fewer points at which judges engage directly with thoseproofs and arguments. In a significant portion of the cases, initial reviewof the briefs is delegated to clerks or staff, oral argument is not conducted,and opinions are drafted by clerks or staff. For most judges, importantcomponents of what are part of the judicial role in the idealized conceptionare delegated in the remainder of their case load as well. Law clerksperform much of the initial analysis of cases through the review of briefsand preparation of bench memoranda and typically prepare the initialdrafts of opinions. This is not to suggest that judges are not engaging inthe parties’ arguments at all. But in order for this delegation to be useful,it must necessarily be the case that it reduces the judge’s workload, whichin turn means that it reduces both the quantity and depth of the judge’scontact with the parties’ contentions.Indeed, these modifications not only lessen the likelihood ofresponsiveness by reducing the judge’s contact with the parties’arguments, but also introduce occasions for the arguments to be distorted.The judge as consumer of bench memo and editor of an opinion performshis decisional task on what is, in an important sense, a set of secondarydocuments. If the author of those documents somehow mischaracterizesor overlooks the parties’ characterization of the dispute, the judge may notnotice simply because doing so would require a return to the briefs todetermine whether the issues as presented by the memo or opinion draftaccurately reflect the parties’ contentions. A similar dynamic holds for thejudge as monitor of his colleagues’ opinions. Reduced personalengagement with the case at every stage will result in a judge having lessfully developed impressions and recollections of the parties’ arguments.These more embryonic thoughts are in turn more susceptible to beingswayed away from the parties’ contentions if the opinion under review
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153. See supra note 98.
fails to accurately characterize them, or even omits to include some ofthem. Thus, whatever the judge’s inclination to scrutinize a draft opinionon its own terms, that scrutiny will not necessarily result in greatercompliance with the adjudicative duty if the opinion proceeds from amisconceived or incomplete understanding of the dispute.The conditions of modern appellate adjudication are also considerablymore likely to result in opinions that fail to achieve the candor ideal. Evenif the judge’s decisional process otherwise comports entirely with theidealized conception, the mere fact that the opinion is written by someoneelse makes it inevitable that it will at best only partially overlap with thejudge’s reasoning. This line of thought reveals anothershortcoming—namely, that in many cases under the modified process,there is a decision, but not a decisional process of the sort contemplated bythe idealized conception. Consider a judge who merely signs off on therecommendations of a staff lawyer regarding the disposition of a case.That judge’s decision is likely to be the product of half-formedimpressions and assessments of the likelihood that this type of case is topresent the sort of non-routine issues as to which reliance on staff’srecommendation would not be appropriate. Yet if an opinion is issued, itwill invariably depict a decision based on a process of traditional legalreasoning. Not only does the opinion in this situation fail to accuratelycapture the judge’s decisional process, but in an important sense there isnot actually a decisional process to be described.Of course, this is all necessarily somewhat speculative. It seems clearthat the nature of the modern appellate process is more likely to result infailures to satisfy the adjudicative duty. But that does not mean thishappens. The question of whether these changes in the process of appellateadjudication have led to a corresponding increase in courts’ failures tosatisfy the adjudicative duty is an empirical one. And in an importantsense it may be unanswerable. Because so much of the process of judicialdecision-making is internal to the judge, there is ultimately no way todetermine, for example, whether the judge’s decision in a given case isactually responsive to the parties’ proofs and arguments. Nor is it possibleto tell whether the public justifications offered for a decision in an opinionreflect the real reasons the court decided as it did. This is, indeed, why werely on informal constraints rather than legal standards to generatecompliance with the adjudicative duty.153But just as the existence and operation of the informal constraintsprovides strong circumstantial evidence that decisions generated by aprocess subject to those constraints will comply with the adjudicative duty,there is also circumstantial evidence suggesting that decisions generated
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154. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 133 n.34 (discussing the evidence of such a perception).155. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 275 (suggesting that changes to theappellate process from increased caseloads have had an overall negative effect on the quality ofcourts’ output and led to a de facto two-track system where cases that judges perceive as interestingand important continue to receive something close to traditional appellate treatment, while othercases, typically involving less powerful litigants, get less attention). For a somewhat moretheoretical treatment of these issues, see Fiss, supra note 145, at 1467.156. Eighth Circuit Judge Donald Lay opined in 1981 that “courts of appeals today mayprovide in many appeals only an appearance of justice rather than justice itself.” Donald P. Lay,A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).Twelve years later Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt noted that “[t]hose who believe we aredoing the same quality work that we did in the past are simply fooling themselves. . . . The useof . . . makeshift procedures ensures that many cases do not get the full attention they deserve, andthe quality of our work suffers.” Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea toSave the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 52. The following year Ninth Circuit JudgeMary Schroeder suggested that “today’s federal appellate courts are adopting techniques thatseemed designed to prevent them from reaching the merits of cases. These formulas permit us todo everything except decide whether the case at bar was rightly decided. This modernjurisprudence, to put it bluntly, illustrates the maxim, ‘Don’t decide—duck.’” Mary M. Schroeder,Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 9, 27; see also Lauren K. Robel,Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 38-40 (recountingthe responses of federal appellate judges to a survey question regarding how caseload pressuresaffect their ability to do their work). Judge Posner is less convinced:Some might also find a hint of a problem of quality in the rapid fall in the reversalrate, since the less time an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it issimply to affirm the district court or agency, affirmance being the easy way out.But again there are other possibilities.POSNER, supra note 11, at 74-75.157. Such a phenomenon would be consistent with the teachings of cognitive psychology. Theconcept of “bounded rationality”—the idea that each of us possesses a limited amount of cognitiveresources, which we must ration in order to make our way through the world—suggests that:[L]aw follows the principle of unevenness: The workmanship of rules varies inquality, at least in part, as a function of the disparate amounts of effort thatlawmakers choose to devote to different rules. Depending upon how muchimportance they place on the issue before them, lawmakers either rise—orsink—to the occasion.
by today’s modified appellate process are in fact less likely to comply.Certainly, some members of the practicing bar perceive that courts breachthe adjudicative duty with some regularity.  In addition, not only154academics,  but also a large number of judges,  have suggested that the155 156increasing demands on judges’ time have resulted in a situation in whichmany cases do not receive the attention they deserve, which implies at thevery least that courts are inadvertently breaching the adjudicative duty duesimply to a lack of resources.  There is statistical evidence to back up this157
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Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 599, 611 (2003) (footnote omitted).For an application of the bounded rationality concept to explore the “affirmance effect” in appellatecourts, see Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Intothe “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 374-85(2005).158. See DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 119, at 210 tbl.B-1. Lookingback to 1945, one sees a reversal rate of 27.9%. DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 1945ANNUAL REPORT 70 tbl.B-1. But 1960 is generally regarded as the year in which the dramaticchanges in the business of the lower federal courts began. See Martha J. Dragich, Once A Century:Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 n.72.159. See DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 119, at 27 tbl.B-5.160. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 71-77.161. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 98, at 1291 (“It is, of course, difficult to show thatthe outcome of any appeal would be different if the judges had considered the case more carefully,but there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that at least some results would change.”).162. POSNER, supra note 11, at 74-75. Judge Posner is, at a minimum, skeptical of this as theprimary or even a significant explanation for the decline in reversal rates, concluding instead thatthe appellate docket has evolved to include a smaller proportion of difficult cases. Id. at 75-77.163. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 92, at 162.164. Id. at 158, 184.165. LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 27. However, Llewellyn also goes on to state that “whenwisely administered, such removal can prove immaterial.” Id. This immateriality is due to the largeamount of meritless appeals the disposition of which does not require an opinion. Id.
hypothesis. The reversal rate in the federal courts of appeals has declinedfrom 24.5% of cases terminated on the merits in 1960  to 9.4% in1582003.  Some, perhaps even most, of this may be attributable to an159increase in the proportion of meritless appeals together with a progressivenarrowing of the scope of appellate review.  But it is also consistent with160a situation in which judges who have less time to uncover errorconsequently find fewer errors.  As Judge Posner pointedly notes, “[T]he161less time an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it is simplyto affirm the district court or agency, affirmance being the easy wayout.”162There is also evidence to support the additional assertion that courtnorms have changed. Mitu Gulati and C.M.A. McCauliff studied the ThirdCircuit’s use of judgment orders—dispositions accompanied by no ornearly no elaboration—during the period from 1989 to 1996, in which thecourt disposed of roughly sixty percent of its cases by way of judgmentorder.  They argue that the data are consistent with the development of163a norm pursuant to which the court disposed of some of its hardest casesby judgment order despite the existence of internal court rules thatexpressly prohibited such behavior.  This is problematic. As Karl164Llewellyn notes, “However sound this approach to an overloaded calendar,it does remove from the particular case one of the most compellingpressures toward steadiness.”  Even if, as Gulati and McCauliff were165assured, no such norm ever existed on the court, the very mechanism of
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166. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 175-77.167. Schroeder, supra note 156, at 11; see also id. at 27-28 (“We are abandoning the factualand legal analysis, we are abandoning the individual problem, we are abandoning a processessential if we are to reach ‘a right and fair solution.’”).168. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189, 278-81 (2004)(discussing the importance of the perception of legitimacy to the proper functioning of a system ofprocedure).169. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,supra note 99, at 25 (“The use of nonjudicial staff, nonargument decision-making procedures,summary orders or unelaborated dispositions, and other procedural accommodations to caseloadvolume have made the courts more efficient, but at some cost to the appearance of legitimacy ofthe appellate process, and at some risk to the quality of appellate justice.”).170. See generally COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OFAPPEALS, supra note 99 (proposing basic and conservative changes, especially focusing on theoverburdened Ninth Circuit); BAKER, supra note 21, at 106-286 (discussing and comparing bothintramural and extramural possibilities for radical and conservative reforms); CARRINGTON, ET AL.,
the judgment order provides no reassurance to the contrary, sinceeverything is left unsaid. Somewhat less insidiously, several judges andcommentators have noted the federal appellate courts’ increasing relianceon deferential standards of review in disposing of cases.  Judge Mary166Schroeder describes these as “techniques of avoidance: describing factorsto be balanced, applying discretionary standards of review, examining thetrial court process rather than the substantive meaning of statutes andrules. They avoid the difficult task of deciding whether the trial courtactually reached the right or fair result in the particular case.”167Regardless of whether they are grounded in empirically verifiablereality, these comments supply another reason to be concerned about themodified appellate process. In the context of adjudicative legitimacy,perception is, in an important sense, reality.  The fact that appellate168courts no longer afford to each case that comes before them the sametreatment, both relative to the other cases on the docket and to thehistorical norm, creates in observers the impression that courts are not“doing their job” with respect to some portion of their caseloads.  Even169if it were possible to demonstrate that the implementation of thetraditional, full appellate process in all of these cases would change neitherthe result nor the essential components of the decisional process, the factthat the public’s perception is otherwise counsels consideration ofmechanisms for restoring adjudicative legitimacy.IV.  JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS INFORMATIONAL REGULATIONCourts, commentators, and special commissions have devotedcountless hours to the consideration of how the appellate process or thestructure of the appellate courts might be modified to better accommodateever-growing caseloads.  These efforts have resulted in various proposals170
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supra note 99 (suggesting structural and procedural measures to mitigate the adverse effects ofgrowing caseloads in the appellate courts); POSNER, supra note 11 (arguing that volume and sizereforms are not useful and discussing reforms through an economic lens and the modification ofjurisdiction requirements).171. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 242-61.172. Id. at 172-73.173. Id. at 239-42, 269-76 (discussing proposals to eliminate the current circuits and replacethem with smaller courts, and to merge all of the existing circuits into a single court).174. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 297-334 (advocating increasing the size ofthe judiciary as the “obvious solution”).175. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 193.176. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161 (1982); see also ROBERT V.PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 121-40 (4th ed.
in addition to those that have already been implemented and referred to inthe preceding discussion. Examples include the creation of an additionaltier in the federal judiciary,  the use of two-judge panels (rather than the171traditional three) for some categories of cases,  the modification of the172federal appeals courts either by further subdividing the existing circuits oreliminating the circuits entirely,  and the simple addition of judges.  In173 174general, the goal of these proposals has been to facilitate courts’ ability tocope with rising caseloads through reduction of each judge’s workload.175Such reduction would occur by making each judge responsible for fewercases in the aggregate, removing or deemphasizing some portion of thedecisional process from the judge’s workload (as by shifting some portionof the circuit courts’ law creation function to another judicial level), orsome combination thereof. The apparent working assumption is that thekey to restoring adjudicative legitimacy is to provide judges with moretime to perform their responsibilities.This Part opens the exploration of a somewhat different avenue ofreform. Rather than focusing on the reduction of judicial workload, itconsiders whether there may be ways to modify the process of appellateadjudication so as to encourage more consistent compliance with theadjudicative duty without significantly affecting workload. Toward thatend, and as a prelude to the next Part’s proposal, this Part develops aconception of judicial opinions as “informational regulation.” Such ananalysis not only provides a fresh perspective on the forms and functionsof judicial opinions, but also invites consideration of how the opiniondevice might be modified so as to better channel the behavior that itostensibly merely reflects.A.  An Overview of Informational RegulationTraditional regulation operates largely through the imposition ofregulatory prescriptions or targets relating to such things as means ofproduction, rates, allocation of scarce resources, and the like.  Under176
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2003) (providing an overview of environmental regulatory strategies).177. See BREYER, supra note 176, at 163.178. See id.179. See id. at 161.180. See id. at 163.181. See id. at 161.182. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949,960-61 (1991).183. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins andBeyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestackto SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L.REV. 515, 530 (2004) (“One of the most promising [recent] developments is the concept thatinformation may be a surprisingly effective and efficient regulatory instrument.”).184. BREYER, supra note 176, at 161-62.185. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI andPerformance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260-61 (2001);
these mechanisms, the means to achieving the regulatory goal is arequirement that the regulated entity alter its conduct so as to comply withthe prescription or target.  Manufacturers, for example, must produce177goods having certain features, and industry must reduce its pollutantemissions to specified levels. However, experience has revealed thesetraditional “command-and-control” approaches to be frequentlycumbersome and inefficient, and consequently policymakers haveexplored alternate methodologies.178One of the more prominent alternatives is “informational regulation.”179Under a regime of informational regulation, what is imposed on regulatedentities is not a restriction on the targeted conduct itself, but rather anobligation to disclose certain information relating to that conduct.  The180manufacturer does not have to change the product, but instead must tell theworld more about it. The animating principle is that the audience for theinformation will, by virtue of being better informed, be better positionedto monitor and thus act vis-à-vis the regulated entity, and thereby exertpressure for change via market or political channels.  Consistent with this181understanding, informational regulation is thought to be most efficient insituations where members of the public would otherwise have difficultyobtaining the relevant information.  182Although the mandatory disclosure mechanism is hardly new, its useas a regulatory tool has become increasingly prevalent in recent decadesand represents, in Cass Sunstein’s estimation, “one of the most strikingdevelopments in the last generation of American law.”  Mandatory183disclosure requirements have accordingly been employed across suchdiverse subject areas as banking, securities, food and drugs, theenvironment, and automobile safety.  Even so, only within the past184decade has there emerged much scholarly consideration of themechanisms of informational regulation.  The resulting literature has185
782 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care,99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (1999); Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism,48 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 804 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of EnvironmentalRegulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21-24 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 183, at 613; Cass R.Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.653, 654 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 182, at 949; Vandenbergh, supra note 183, at 522-23. Seegenerally David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation,31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10773 (2001) (providing an overview of the economic and legal literatureconcerning informational regulation in the environmental context). The literature in the securitieslaw area has a somewhat longer history. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solutionto Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1995) (noting the existence of “a small butinfluential theoretical literature . . . on the efficiency of mandatory disclosure”).186. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 614.187. Id. at 619. As Sunstein acknowledges, mandatory disclosure may often serve both ends.Id. 188. See BREYER, supra note 176, at 161.189. See id. at 162.190. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 619.191. See Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 185, at 655-56.
loosely categorized the types and aims of informational regulation, as wellas the limitations that inhere in disclosure-based mechanisms.1.  The Benefits of Informational RegulationThe most salient benefits of informational regulation accrue via itsmarket- and political process-enhancing effects. As this suggests, thedevice is versatile. Disclosure requirements can be aimed at modifying (orat least informing) the behavior of private actors—as is the case withnutritional labeling on food products—or directed toward the behavior ofgovernmental agents—as with the requirement that agencies prepareenvironmental impact statements in connection with major actions.  As186these examples reflect, disclosure requirements can be divided betweendisclosure requirements designed to facilitate the functioning of marketsand those designed to enhance the operation of political safeguards.  The187premise underlying the former is that market participants must possess acertain minimum amount of information in order for a market to functionproperly.  Federal securities laws provide one of the more prominent188examples of mandatory disclosure geared toward this end.  Disclosure189designed to trigger political safeguards stems from the analogous idea thatproperly functioning democracy requires that citizens possess anappropriate baseline amount of information in order to be effectiveparticipants in the political process.  Both private actors and190governmental entities often lack the incentive (or face disincentives) todisclose information necessary to a full assessment of their decisions.191Required disclosure of such information can enable the now-informed
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192. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1801-25; Sunstein, supra note 183, at 625-26.193. Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 299 (quoting Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparencyand Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342(1996)).194. See Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 297.195. See id. at 294-305.196. See Stewart, supra note 185, at 127-28 (placing informational regulation within the“reflexive law” conception of regulation).197. See id. at 127.198. See Mary Graham, Information as Risk Regulation: Lessons from Experience 9-10,(Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper No. RPP-2001-04, 2001), available atwww.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2001-04.pdf.
public not only to better monitor the actions of officials to ensure thatthose actions are consistent with applicable standards, but also to monitorthe appropriateness and effectiveness of the standards themselves, and toeffectively debate the need for modifications.192There are also less-apparent advantages that can result from theimposition of a disclosure requirement. One of particular interest forpresent purposes is that informational regulation can directly affect theregulated entity’s conduct. That is, the very process of complying with adisclosure requirement can also lead to changes in the underlying activityindependent of the effects of external monitoring. The phrase oftenassociated with this effect is “‘you manage what you measure.’”  To the193extent a disclosure requirement leads the regulated entity to compileinformation it had not previously gathered, the entity may make differentdecisions than it otherwise would have, simply as a result of havingadditional information to take into consideration in its decision-makingprocess.  Thus, even in a situation where there is no prospect that194disclosure will trigger any external consequences, a disclosing entity mayhave other reasons, including simple business imperatives, to modify itsbehavior.  Relatedly, the process of complying with a disclosure195requirement might lead to the internalization of the norms underlying theregulatory regime, leading in turn to behavior that is generally moreconsistent with those norms even without further regulatory activity.196A further benefit present across all these mechanisms is thatinformational regulation allows for flexibility of response. Traditionalregulation works by prescribing some aspect of the regulated entities’conduct, which to be effective requires the regulator to anticipate all of thesituations to which the requirement might apply.  Informational197regulation, in contrast, allows the regulated entity to determine how bestto change its practices to be more consistent with the goals of theregulatory regime, and indeed to decide whether to adjust its conduct atall.198Any given regime of informational regulation can have many or even
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199. Id. at 7 (observing that “in practice there are probably few cases of requirements thatcreate incentives that are purely economic or purely political”).200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (2000).201. See id. § 4332(C).202. As Bradley Karkkainen puts it: “NEPA famously requires federal agencies to produceenvironmental impact statements (EISs) prior to undertaking ‘major Federal actions significantlyaffecting the quality of the human environment.’ It requires little else, and therein lies both itssingular genius and its fatal flaw.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoringand Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002)(footnote omitted).203. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810-11 (2d ed. 1994).204. See Karkkainen, supra note 202, at 909-16.205. See id. at 910-11.206. The TRI was created by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Actof 1986 (EPCRA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2000)).
all of these types of effects.  Consider two of the prominent examples of199informational regulation in the environmental context. The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act (NEPA)  requires federal agencies not merely200to consider the environmental consequences of their proposed activities,but also to issue an environmental impact statement (EIS) including adetailed discussion of those consequences as well as alternatives.201Significantly, that is nearly all that NEPA requires. It does not create anyrequirements concerning how the agencies use the information once it hasbeen compiled.  NEPA, then, can be categorized as requiring disclosure202aimed at modifying the behavior of governmental agents through theoperation of political safeguards. An EIS makes at least part of anagency’s decision-making process transparent, and therefore subject to thescrutiny of the public as well as other political actors. At the same time,at least part of the motivation behind NEPA was to improve agencydecision-making independent of these political effects.  A mere203requirement that agencies take environmental considerations into account,the reasoning goes, would be largely meaningless standing alone. Butwhen combined with the processes necessary to generate an EIS—largelythe gathering and analysis of information that might otherwise have goneunconsidered—the resulting agency decisions should be better simplybecause they are better informed.  At the same time, the process might204lead to the internalization of environmental norms, such that agencybehavior becomes generally more environmentally conscious without theneed for further regulation.205The second prominent example of informational regulation in theenvironmental area is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).  Under TRI,206facilities that meet certain minimum thresholds must report, in astandardized fashion, their annual releases of more than 650 toxic
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207. See id. § 11023.208. See EPA.gov, Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (lastvisited Mar. 27, 2006).209. See EPA.gov, What is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program?,http://www.epa.gov/tri/whatis.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).210. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 176, at 485.211. See id. at 485-90; see also Schroeder, supra note 185, at 818-19 (attributing the emissionsreductions resulting from TRI “to the impact of the disclosures themselves . . . . without any directregulation being imposed on these various sources, they apparently have responded to citizenreaction, or anticipated citizen reaction, to the information disclosed by the TRI.”).212. PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 210, at 485-90.213. See Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 295-305.214. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 626-27.215. For a detailed discussion of the potential negative effects of informational regulation, seeSunstein, Informing America, supra note 185, at 667-69.216. See id. at 667.217. See id.; see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and ItsConsequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-20 (2003).
chemicals.  The EPA, in turn, compiles this information in a publicly207accessible database.  The TRI is largely directed toward affecting the208behavior of private actors, namely the companies that own or operate thefacilities that release toxic chemicals.  As with NEPA, the animating209principle was to enable the public to inform itself about companies’environmental behavior and to exert market and political pressure againstthose with high emissions.  Indeed, the TRI is considered one of the210more successful instances of informational regulation. Not only has it ledto reductions in emissions,  it has proven to be a valuable source of211information for Congress and the EPA to use in adjusting regulatoryrequirements and strategy.  What is more, like NEPA, the TRI may have212led to behavioral changes simply as a result of making informationregarding toxic emissions both available and salient to the appropriatedecision-makers.2132.  The Costs of Informational RegulationThere are, of course, limitations and drawbacks associated withinformational regulation. First, information can be costly to gather ordistribute, and the costs may outweigh the resulting benefits.  Second,214the information may not have its desired effect simply because of thelimitations of human cognition.  For example, people are consistently215poor at assessing certain types of information, such as that relating to low-probability events, with the potential result being either an under- or over-reaction to disclosure.  And too much information may lead to overload,216in which case recipients tend to ignore all the information provided.217
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218. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1781.219. See id. at 1781-82 (arguing that “[i]ncreasing attention to the items for which disclosureis mandated inevitably diverts resources from other uses which may be more valuable to society”)(footnote omitted).220. See Karkkainen, supra note 202, at 921-23 (describing the tendency for agencies togenerate such EISs). Karkkainen concludes that NEPA’s present configuration creates incentivesfor agencies to attempt first to avoid the EIS requirement altogether, and, when they cannot, toproduce EISs that “tend to consist of exhaustive compilations of recycled information, sometimesof dubious quality.” Id. at 923.221. See Graham, supra note 198, at 19.222. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1781.223. See id.
Third, mandatory disclosure may skew the incentives of the discloser.218While we may want agencies to take environmental considerations intoadequate account while making decisions, we almost certainly do not wantthem to do so to the exclusion of other matters. Yet by requiring agenciesto devote resources to the preparation of EISs, we may be doing justthat.  Alternatively, agencies forced to deal with the preparation of EISs219on a regular basis may develop “boilerplate” approaches to the process,such that the information provided has the appearance of exhaustiveness,but does not reflect a considered analysis.  Relatedly, disclosure may220underinform or misinform the monitoring activity of the audience to whichit is directed. The TRI, for example, facilitates monitoring of companieswith respect to those chemicals to which its reporting requirements relate,but in so doing it may draw the attention of the public and advocacygroups away from companies’ handling of substances not on the requireddisclosure list but which may ultimately pose a greater danger.2213.  The Importance of DesignAs the preceding discussion suggests, it is critical to the effectivenessof any scheme of informational regulation that the disclosure mechanismbe precisely tailored to the ends sought to be achieved.  This requires in222the first instance an understanding of the nature of those ends.  A lack of223consensus concerning the purposes of the regulatory regime can thusthwart the development of a scheme of informational regulation, either bypreventing agreement on what should be disclosed or by inducingcompromise that results in either incomplete or inapposite disclosurerequirements. In similar fashion, an incomplete understanding of thepurposes animating a regulatory regime or of the processes being regulatedmight lead to the formulation of a disclosure requirement that misdirectsthe efforts of the disclosing entity and the intended audience for theinformation. Both will tend to focus on the information provided, and toexert pressure for change at the mechanisms underlying that information
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224. This is not to suggest that informational regulation is inappropriate absent acomprehensive understanding of the processes sought to be regulated. It may be, for example, thatan incomplete or misdirected scheme of informational regulation may lead to the development ofknowledge and experience based on which to formulate more finely-calibrated regulation in thefuture.225. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.226. See supra Part II.C.227. This is not to suggest that there is no direct regulation of judicial decision-making. Quitethe contrary is true. Because judges are to decide cases in accordance with the law, in an importantsense all of law operates as direct regulation in this context. At least in an idealized sense, thejudicial role involves simply determining what the law is, and applying that law to the precisesituation presented. The law, however, will not always provide an answer. Whatever one’s positionon larger jurisprudential debates concerning the extent to which the law actually constrains judicialbehavior, it seems clear that the law does not provide definitive answers in a substantial portion ofcases that are litigated to the stage of requiring some sort of judicial determination. There will oftenbe uncertainty concerning what the applicable legal standard is, which of multiple conflicting
to the near-exclusion of other conduct. As a consequence, informationalregulation should ideally follow a relatively comprehensive analysis of theprocesses to which the disclosure is to relate, so as to determine what themost important components of those processes are. At a minimum, thosedesigning a program of informational regulation must take care to ensurethat the consequences of disclosure are not inconsistent with the goals ofregulation.224B.  Judicial Opinions as Informational RegulationAlthough the idea that judicial opinions serve as an example ofinformational regulation has gone unexplored, the conceptual fit betweenthe informational regulation template and the judicial opinion device isstrong. In a basic sense, opinions simply look like informationalregulation. The entity subject to regulation—the court—is required todisclose certain information—the justifications for its decision, via awritten opinion—thereby facilitating the monitoring of its conduct. Theanalogy works at a deeper level as well. As is the case in the paradigmaticinstance of informational regulation,  opinions serve to provide the225public with information to which it would have virtually no access absenta disclosure requirement. As noted above, the judicial decision-makingprocess is for the most part inherently private.  Not even those with the226most information bearing on a court’s decision—the litigantsthemselves—are likely to know why a court acted as it did without anexplanation. This lack of access to information is particularly acute in theappellate setting, where oral argument represents the only other portion ofthe process where the public can see the court “in action.” As we have alsoseen, opinions further relate to a process as to which direct regulation islargely ineffective.  Courts might occasionally suggest that they are227
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standards ought to be given precedence, or how the standard ought to be applied to the facts of agiven case. In these cases, however broad a portion of the judiciary’s workload they may represent,a judge cannot mechanically act in conformity with some preexisting constraint. Instead, thejudicial role, to a large extent, involves the formulation, modification, and exercise of judgment inthe application of those constraints.228. See supra Part III.A.229. See supra Part III.B.230. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 120-21. See generally James Boyd White, What’s AnOpinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995) (considering the relationship between opinions andthe concept of precedent).231. See White, supra note 230, at 1363-64.232. See id. at 1364.233. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 412 (noting that “rules ordinarily cannot emerge froman outcome unless the reasons for that outcome are given”); White, supra note 230, at 1365-66.
under an obligation to decide in a certain way, but these suggestionscannot meaningfully be made enforceable.  Opinions accordingly228function as an important component of the cluster of informal constraintsthat have traditionally operated to regulate judicial behavior.229The existing literature concerning the functions of judicial opinionsidentifies three primary functions of opinions: to create precedent, toprovide the parties and the public with assurance that judicial decisions arebased on appropriate grounds, and to discipline the decision-makingprocess. Each of these functions bears at least some of the hallmarks ofinformational regulation, and the literature implicitly recognizes thesecharacteristics. Express consideration of opinions as informationalregulation, however, allows for a more refined sense of the capabilities ofthe opinion device, particularly as it relates to opinions as a means toshape decision-making. The remainder of this subsection develops aconception of these functions as informational regulation, and outlines thefeatures of opinions necessary to best support that functioning.1.  Devices for the Creation of PrecedentPerhaps the most apparent function of appellate judicial opinions is tomemorialize decisions for use as precedent in subsequent cases.230Opinions are virtually indispensable to a precedent-based system.  This231is not to suggest that it would be impossible to have a system of precedentwithout judicial opinions, but that it would necessarily be a very different,less precise system.  Observers could still track results in cases, could232draw conclusions regarding the types of facts and arguments that seem tohave mattered in those cases, and could accordingly make arguments to acourt about the appropriateness of deciding a given case in a particularway based on how a similar case was decided in a specific way in thepast.  But, as James Boyd White observes, these arguments would be233limited, because they could not explain: 
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234. White, supra note 230, at 1365-66.235. Id. at 1367.236. See id.237. See id. at 1366-67.238. See id. at 1368.239. As Henry Hart puts it:[T]he test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the four cornersof the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds of thousands oflawyers and government officials who have to deal at first hand with the problems
[W]hat each [case] meant in an accurate and authoritativeway . . . . [f]or only the judge himself can tell you what factscounted for him, or did not count; what paradigm or templatehe applied to it; or how he resolved the tension, present innearly every case, between the claims that can rationally bemade on one side and those that can be made on the other.”234All that would be possible in such a regime would be rough prediction.“But with the opinion, a wholly different dimension of legal life andthought becomes possible—the systematic and reasoned invocation of thepast as precedent. With this practice, in turn, there can emerge aninstitution that simultaneously explains and limits itself over time.”235Even in this function one can see elements of informational regulation.Put aside for now the fact that assuring compliance with the essential idealof a system of precedent—that like cases be treated alike—requires somemethod of comparing past and present cases. Judicial opinions asstatements of law facilitate monitoring along another dimension—namely,monitoring of the law itself.  Opinions are not only the place where236courts state what the law is, but also where they must justify the law theyhave articulated.  Both in the context of the individual case and across an237entire line of cases, opinions allow for the doctrines courts create to beanalyzed and critiqued.  Interested parties can thereby exert appropriate238pressures for change either through further resort to the judicial branch orthrough the political branches. The key aspect of opinions in performing this function is clarity ofexposition. The more clearly an opinion articulates the reasoningunderlying the court’s analysis and conclusions, the better able theaudiences for the judiciary’s doctrinal output (the legislative and executivebranches, the bar, and the public more generally) will be to assess thesoundness of that doctrine, and act in response to it. At the same time,clarity of doctrinal expression is valuable to those who must conform theirconduct to the law. Such actors are better able to draw appropriate lines instructuring their affairs  and can more comfortably assume that future239
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of everyday life and of the thousands of judges who have to handle the great massof the litigation which ultimately develops.Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73HARV. L. REV. 84, 96 (1959).240. See id. at 737.241. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 119-20; Wald, supra note 152, at 1372.242. This was Fuller’s argument in favor of generally requiring opinions. See supra note 34and accompanying text.
courts confronted with a similar question will interpret the doctrinalstatements of the prior court in a manner consistent with the actors’reading.Notably, in the performance of this function neither candor norresponsiveness is especially important in any given case. To the extent thattheir opinions function merely as statements of law, courts resemblelegislatures in that what they say generally matters considerably more thanwhy they said it. Future courts will be guided by prior courts’ opinions,and thus by prior courts’ public statements regarding the nature of thedispute before them and why it was resolved as it was. If the prior courtrecharacterized the facts of the dispute, or provided reasons for its decisionthat were not the true reasons, a subsequent court will not be likely toknow that and will deal with the prior opinion on its own terms. This is notto suggest that candor and responsiveness are not important to thefunctioning of opinions as repositories of doctrine. Both are generallynecessary to establish the background norms on which the system ofprecedent depends.  If courts consistently fail to provide accurate240accounts of the reasons for their decisions or to resolve the actual disputepresented to them (as opposed to a version of the dispute with some of thetroublesome facts overlooked), then the doctrinal statements in opinionswould become meaningless as everyone realized that they were merely afaçade behind which courts exercised unbridled discretion. A departurefrom candor or responsiveness in a single case, however, is unlikely tohave a significant impact on an opinion’s status as a statement of law.2.  Devices to Facilitate Monitoring of AdjudicationThere is another sense in which opinions facilitate monitoring, whichrepresents the most apparent manifestation of opinions serving asinformational regulation. Opinions facilitate the monitoring of judicialconduct apart from the creation of precedent in two significant respects.First, opinions allow for the monitoring of the disposition of individualcases.  An opinion provides the parties to a case (and the public, more241generally) with assurance that the court’s decision was based onappropriate factors and reached pursuant to the appropriate processes.242
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243. Wald, supra note 152, at 1372.244. See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 737.245. See supra Part III.B.246. See Wald, supra note 152, at 1372, 1376 (suggesting that opinions “demonstrate ourrecognition that under a government of laws, ordinary people have a right to expect that the lawwill apply to all citizens alike” and asserting that opinions are necessary for the existence of“reasonably consistent justice administered by hundreds of judges for millions of people”).
As Judge Wald puts it, opinions serve “to reinforce [courts’] oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others—including ourduly-elected political leaders—what to do.”  If a court’s explanation for243its decision fails to satisfy one of the many metrics by which judicialdecisions are to be assessed, such as rationality, compliance with law orresponsiveness to the parties’ arguments, the parties or the public canrespond. Such a response might involve public critique of the court and theopinion or resort to a higher court or legislature.  There is another244component to this dynamic. As we have seen, internal monitoring hashistorically constituted a substantial constraint on appellate adjudication.245If the judge responsible for drafting an opinion failed to account for someaspect of the case, his colleagues could be relied on to call the matter to hisattention following their review of the opinion. This latter form ofmonitoring in the individual case receives less attention in the literature,but may ultimately be more significant as a means of regulating judicialconduct.The second respect in which opinions facilitate monitoring is moregeneral. Opinions enable the assessment of courts’ performance over along period of time and a large number of cases. Over such expanses itbecomes possible to determine the extent to which courts are in facttreating like cases alike, or whether instead certain categories of cases ortypes of litigants receive differential treatment.  Opinions further246facilitate monitoring for candor by allowing for evaluation of therelationship between the results in individual cases and a court’s statedreasons for its resolution of those cases. Put another way, opinions enableobservers to check the pattern of results in individual cases when viewedover time against both the specifics of the legal doctrine ostensibly beingapplied and the underlying goals of that doctrine. Only such a distantperspective can reveal whether, for example, a doctrine that purports togive criminal defendants a procedural advantage ever actually results indefendant victories. If it doesn’t, the problem might lie with the doctrine,which might be unworkable for some reason. Or the problem might liewith the courts, whose failure to be candid about their reasons for decidingthe cases in question could perhaps only be revealed through an analysisof the results of a series of cases over time. In either case, the existence ofthe disconnect between the apparent dictates of doctrine and the results in
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247. See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 115, at 57-58 (discussing the ways in which the act ofwriting constrains the act of deciding); Wald, supra note 152, at 1374-75 (noting that the processof justifying a decision often leads to a change of rationale or even result, and contrasting this withthe process of “writing to explain a pre-ordained result”).248. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L.REV. 1159, 1186 (2004) (“When a lawyer is required to commit a legal argument, or a judge isrequired to commit a judicial opinion to writing, she becomes capable of a level of both creativeand critical thinking that is not possible when legal analysis is expressed only in an oral form.”).249. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 120 (“A decisionmaker who must reason through to aconclusion in print has reasoned in fact.”); CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 99, at 31 (noting that“[c]onclusions easily reached without setting down the reasons sometimes undergo revision whenthe decider sets out to justify the decision.”); McGowan, supra note 79, at 513 (“[T]he premise thatjudicial writing can be divorced from deciding or other aspects of judging is wrong. How thejudicial opinion is written affects how cases are decided: Writing affects how judges judge.”).250. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 513-14 (arguing for the indispensability of writtenopinions authored by judges themselves).
actual cases can be brought to the attention of the courts or political bodiesin an effort to better align the two.As this discussion suggests, candor is critical for opinions to effectivelyfulfill their mission as devices to enable monitoring of judicial conduct.Only when a court discloses the true reasons for its decision is it possiblefor a reader to determine whether the court acted appropriately and,consequently, to react to the court’s decision in an appropriate manner.And to the extent that one accepts the prescriptions of the adjudicativeduty outlined in Part I, this in turn requires that opinions should reflect ananalysis that is appropriately responsive to the parties’ contentions.3.  Devices to Affect Performance of the Judicial FunctionJudges frequently observe that the mere fact of having to write anopinion affects the process of deciding a case.  Certainly the use of247writing, as opposed to purely oral methods of disposing of cases, allowsfor a controlled process in which complicated problems are more easilyresolved.  What is more, those who have experienced the process of248organizing one’s thoughts and putting them down on paper know that itinevitably leads to refinement of rationale, often leads to substantialchanges in rationale, and occasionally leads to entirely differentconclusions.  To the extent, then, that rationality is an important source249of adjudicative legitimacy, and that the more heavily deliberated decisionswith written opinions are consequently more rational, opinions aredesirable—and perhaps even indispensable —components of the250adjudicative process.The literature on the functions of judicial opinions generally does notadvance beyond the basic observation that the act of writing requires more(and more disciplined) thought, which might in turn engender different
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251. But see id. at 513 (“The opinion form also affects what questions judges believe they maydecide and how they may decide them.”).252. See, e.g., Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2005) (Roth, J.);Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (Roth, J.); United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d1104, 1108 (3d Cir. 1995) (Roth, J.); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1992)(Roth, J.).253. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 155-60.254. See Dan Simon, The Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy ofCardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (2000) (discussing, through an analysis of Cardozo’s work,the difficulty judges have in understanding their decisional process).
thought.  This overlooks what is apparent from consideration of judicial251opinions in light of the literature on informational regulation, namely thatthere are more subtle ways in which the opinion form directs the processof judging. Consider, for example, a judge who follows an opinion formatthat invariably includes a paragraph addressing the nature and source ofthe court’s jurisdiction.  Such a judge, in a classic example of252management of what is measured, would be considerably less likely tomiss a problem with the court’s jurisdiction than a judge who does notmake it a practice to address jurisdiction.It is this last observation that is most valuable in terms of usingopinions as a device to remedy judicial inactivism. Perhaps the opinionform can be harnessed to change the manner in which judges go aboutdeciding cases and, to the extent the processes are distinguishable, theprocess of justifying their decisions. If opinion design can be modified soas to encourage greater candor and responsiveness, decisions would tendtoward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty as a result of thechanges. And since increased candor eases the burdens involved inmonitoring adjudicative behavior, further compliance would follow.A candor requirement is, however, more easily articulated thanimplemented. Those who have considered the topic of candor in detailhave uniformly come to the conclusion that, whatever its desirability as amatter of theory, full candor is unattainable in practice.  Judges253themselves are unlikely to fully understand, much less be able to describe,their decisional process in any given case.  Perhaps the best we can hope254for, then, is a set of proxies for full candor. Although we cannot knowprecisely how the judge made her way from a set of inputs (facts,precedent, arguments, and the like) to a conclusion, by making thatinformation readily available and encouraging, if not requiring, an opinionthat sets forth a reasoning process tying those inputs together as itproceeds to a conclusion, we could promote greater responsiveness and,at the very least, make it more difficult for a judge to avoid providing acandid justification for a decision. The next Part explores the possibilityof such a mechanism.
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255. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 27 (“[T]he very fact that the opinion has variedfunctions makes it possible to play up one to the neglect of another.”).256. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.257. Interestingly, early proposals for limited publication of opinions came from the bar,which found that an increasingly large number of opinions made it difficult to keep pace withcourts’ output. See, e.g., John J. O’Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. L.Q.13, 14 (1949) (referencing such a proposal).258. See supra Part III.C.1.259. See ALDISERT, supra note 79, at 607 (suggesting that the necessary components of anopinion are a “narration of adjudicative facts, . . . the statement of the issue or issues framing thecase for decision,” and the justification for the court’s decision).260. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
V.  FRAMING ARGUMENTS—USING THE OPINION FORM TO RESTOREADJUDICATIVE LEGITIMACYAlthough the informational-regulatory features of judicial opinions areapparent, it is likewise clear that opinions in their present form serve assomewhat blunt instruments in terms of facilitating the monitoring anddirecting of judicial behavior.  In part this is simply a function of255information overload on a broad scale. Given the sheer volume of opinionsissued by courts, both external and internal monitoring has become moredifficult simply because of the magnitude of the resources necessary to doso effectively.  Externally, while the parties remain relatively well-256positioned to assess, based on an opinion, whether the court in their caseresolved it in an appropriate way, the public generally has long beenunable to engage in effective monitoring via review of opinions.  Under257the idealized conception of appellate adjudication, judges have ample timeto study an opinion drafted by one of their colleagues, and to do so in lightof the parties’ contentions as developed in the briefs and at oral argument.Now, however, the time for leisurely review and reflection has vanished.And, as we have seen, procedural changes implemented to conservejudicial time have worked to decrease the depth of judges’ contact withmost cases.  Not only does today’s judge have less time to monitor, she258also has a less-developed understanding on which to base her monitoring.If one of her colleagues nods, she is less likely to notice. The same is trueif the colleague intentionally departs from the appropriate manner ofresolution. When the departure involves inactivist conduct—whichgenerally involves a failure to act rather than misguided action—she willbe especially disadvantaged in her ability to detect a violation.The opinion form also contributes to its shortcomings as an instrumentof informational regulation by failing to channel judicial behavior towardcompliance with the adjudicative duty. At present, although there iscertainly a rough uniformity among judicial opinions from judge to judgeand from court to court,  courts do not closely prescribe format.  As a259 260
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261. See Wald, supra note 152, at 1386, 1389-90 (observing that the author of an appellateopinion has considerable room in which to manipulate the factual story in a case and that judgesdo occasionally engage in such manipulation).
consequence, opinion authors enjoy considerable freedom to manipulatetheir portrayal of the facts of the case, the parties’ arguments, and soforth.  Nothing ensures that an opinion issued by one judge would greatly261resemble an opinion in the same case were it to be issued by a differentjudge. The amorphousness of the opinion form renders it deficient as aninformational-regulatory device in two ways. First, it hampers themonitoring function. Because the reader of an opinion can have no fixedexpectation regarding what should appear in it, he cannot know simplyfrom the opinion when something that should be there is not there. In thisway the lack of a prescribed format abets inactivism. It also thwartsmonitoring by preventing effective comparison of cases against oneanother. If a judge writing an opinion in Case B has (and uses) the freedomto portray it as being more similar to Case A than it really is, then itbecomes considerably more difficult to determine whether, for example,like cases are really being treated alike. Confronted with the opinion inCase B, an observer has no way of knowing that Case B was actually notlike Case A, and therefore perhaps should not have been resolved in thesame way. Second, it results in opinions falling short of their potential tochannel the conduct of judges. For example, absent a meaningfulrequirement that all the parties’ contentions be at least mentioned in anopinion, a court is less likely to keep track of all those contentions andtherefore to address them. A court is also better able to intentionally avoidaddressing every argument, because aside from the parties (one of whomwill be happy with the court’s disposition and thus not care), no one islikely to discover such avoidance. Put in the lingo of informationalregulation, because such considerations are not measured, they are notmanaged.Conceiving of opinions as a form of informational regulation bothinvites and facilitates consideration of how the opinion device might bemodified to direct judicial behavior. Taking Part I’s definition of theadjudicative duty as its regulatory goal, this Part proposes a simplemodification to the opinion format, framing arguments, the use of whichwould bring about direct gains in the responsiveness of judicial decision-making and (though to a lesser extent) in the candor with which decisionsare justified, and would likewise enhance the ability to monitoradjudication both internally and externally. Moreover, these effects,together with less apparent potential benefits to the quality of advocacyand parties’ sense of participation in the process, would accrue withoutunduly constraining judges in the exercise of their function.
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262. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.263. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.264. See supra notes 117, 131 and accompanying text.
A.  Framing Arguments as a Means to Combat Judicial InactivismThe framing argument concept is a simple one. The primarycomponent would be brief, party-generated statements of the issues beforethe court  that would be included as a part of any opinion issued by thecourt. In effect, each party would have the opportunity to place itsassessment of what is at stake in a case alongside the court’s. Aside fromthe presence of these statements in opinions, nothing would change, atleast in terms of what judges would be required to include in theiropinions. Instead, the mere presence of this additional information wouldboth facilitate the monitoring of judicial behavior and shape that behaviormore directly. 1.  Effects on the Decision-Making ProcessJudges forced to write opinions preceded by framing arguments aremore likely to reach decisions in a manner that is at least weaklyresponsive to the parties’ arguments. This follows from the notion thatwhat is measured will be managed.  As judges’ increasing workloads262have limited their ability to become deeply engaged with most of the casesthat come before them, they are inevitably less able to keep track of, andtherefore be responsive to, the parties’ claims. This is particularly so giventhat judges today are more often the editors of the opinions issued undertheir name rather than the authors.  When the initial draft of an opinion263is prepared by a law clerk, who as a recent law school graduate ismarkedly less law-conditioned  than a judge, the opinion may be less264responsive than would be the case were the judge the author. Even if oneassumes that a clerk would generally tend to write an opinion that isappropriately responsive, the writing of such an opinion does nothing toensure that the underlying decision was responsive. And to the extent thejudge relies on a clerk’s characterization of the dispute when editing anopinion rather than returning to the briefs, the judge’s edits maythemselves make the opinion less responsive.Yet framing arguments retain the flexibility that is one of the primarybenefits of informational regulation. The presence of the parties’contentions as part of the opinion increases the likelihood that the courtwill be mindful of them in deciding the case, and will at least speak tothem in its opinion. The court will thus satisfy its obligation to be weaklyresponsive, while not being compelled to engage in either strongresponsiveness or any particular depth of treatment. If a party’s
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265. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.266. Id.
contentions are facially without merit, the court can dispose of themquickly. If the court concludes the parties have misconceived the nature oftheir dispute, it can briefly state why that is so before proceeding toanalyze the case in the terms the court deems appropriate.The use of framing arguments would likewise encourage candor,primarily by making it more difficult for a court to recharacterize thedispute before it so as to avoid what it considers troublesome aspects ofthat dispute. For example, a court faced with a claim governed by a line ofprecedent that seems to compel a result the court finds distasteful mightnormally choose to recast or gloss over the difficult aspects of the casebefore it. The presence of framing arguments would make it more difficultto do so, however, and would force the court instead to be moreforthcoming about the reasons behind its resolution. This effect on candorwould of course be limited. Merely having to confront the parties’characterization of the dispute does not ensure that a court’s stated reasonsfor resolving the dispute are its actual reasons for doing so. Still, in theaggregate, framing arguments seem likely to result in more candidopinions.Framing arguments’ effects on the process of adjudicating individualcases might in turn result in more generalized benefits. The literature oninformational regulation recognizes norm internalization as one of thelegitimate goals of a disclosure-based regime.  The underlying idea here265is that an entity required to disclose certain information will become moresensitized to the concerns animating the disclosure requirement, and willadjust its conduct accordingly.  Thus, even if framing arguments are not266implemented in every case—for example in those cases disposed ofwithout any opinion at all—they may nonetheless affect judicial behaviorin those cases by rehabituating judges to the process of responsivedecision-making. 2.  Effects on MonitoringThe second category of benefits that would flow from the use offraming arguments relates to the ability to monitor. The primary source ofthis benefit would stem from framing arguments’ tendency to substantiallyreduce the effort involved in monitoring a court’s performance. Thepresence of framing arguments would allow a reader to more readilydetermine whether the court ignored an issue in its entirety, whether itsquarely confronted the core of a party’s argument, and whether itadequately dealt with the legal authorities on which the party based itsarguments. In short, a reader would have a ready gauge for assessing the
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267. This would be the case with an unpublished disposition in many courts.268. Thanks to my colleague, Dennis Arrow, for initially spotting this.
extent to which an opinion is responsive to the parties’ arguments. Thiswould facilitate both external and internal monitoring. Not only would thepublic be better positioned to determine whether a court has truly engagedwith the parties’ claims, but so would other members of the court. The salience of the information presented by framing arguments is keyto these benefits. It has, of course, always been possible for an interestedparty to obtain copies of the briefs filed in a case and to compare thearguments made in those briefs with the court’s characterization of theparties’ arguments and its handling of the claims asserted. But, apart fromscholarly interest, there was little point in doing so, and the effort requiredundoubtedly tended to discourage those whose curiosity might otherwisehave led them to undertake this sort of investigation. Even for the judgereviewing a colleague’s draft opinion there is some effort involved inpulling the briefs out of the file and reviewing their characterizations ofwhat is at stake. And while that small step might not have traditionallyproved to be much of an impediment, contemporary circumstances aredifferent. Today’s busy judge may feel it unnecessary to take that extrastep, particularly where she has already signed off on the ultimatedisposition of the case and where the precise manner in which thatdisposition is put into effect may be deemed legally irrelevant to all futurecases.  One might also suggest that the increasing computerization of267legal research will also reduce the effort necessary to uncover the precisenature of the claims asserted. Westlaw, for example, provides a link to theparties’ briefs in its display of recently issued opinions. Accessing thatinformation, however, is not cost-free. Nor does it possess the immediacyof a statement incorporated into the opinion. In short, if framing argumentsare included in an opinion, the reader need look no further for theinformation. The parties’ arguments will accompany the court’s statementof its reasoning wherever the reader should happen to take the opinion.This increases the likelihood that readers will give it attention, andconsequently the likelihood that readers will act in response to what theyperceive as inactivist conduct.3.  Additional BenefitsIn addition to their tendency to enhance the legitimacy of adjudication,the use of framing arguments might produce related benefits.a.  Improved AdvocacyOne additional, potential benefit from the use of framing arguments isthe effect on the quality of advocacy.  Judges, with good reason,268
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269. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON APPELLATE PRACTICE ANDPROCEDURE 368 (1987) (“One of the most common complaints of appellate judges and their lawclerks is the inadequacy of most briefs filed in appellate courts.”); THOMAS B. MARVELL,APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 28-37 (1978) (giving an account of the mutual disdain withwhich appellate judges and lawyers tend to view one another’s work product).270. The overall number of issues could safely remain unlimited, since it would be subject tothe practical caps imposed by page- or word-limits imposed on briefs.271. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIALAND APPELLATE COURTS 80 (2d ed. 2003).272. See Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swiftand Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 526(1980) (discussing participation’s tendency “to promote litigant and societal acceptance of thedecisions rendered by the courts”); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV.981, 995-1002 (1993) (discussing the instrumental and dignitary values of participation); RobertS. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1974) (discussing the value of participation as “an approximation toautonomous self-determination of varying degrees of directness”).
complain about the quality of briefs submitted by counsel every bit asoften as lawyers complain about judicial opinions.  Were lawyers269required to formulate issue statements subject to the possibility that theirwords would appear in the official reporters alongside the court’s opinion,most would undoubtedly spend more time in the effort to craft a statementthat would not make them look foolish. This effect could be enhanced byplacing a strict limit on the number of words that could be used to describeeach issue.  Legal writing guru Bryan Garner insists that “if you can’t270phrase your issue in 75 words, you probably don’t know what the issueis.”  It may take some additional time and effort to reach an effective271formulation within that limit, but both the parties’ argument and thecourt’s decisional process are likely to benefit as a result.b.  Enhanced ParticipationA less tangible benefit likely to arise from the use of framingarguments is that their inclusion in opinions would enhance the parties’sense of participation. This benefit is distinct from the instrumentalbenefits of enhanced participation identified above. In other words, apartfrom its tendency to produce results that are more appropriate in anobjective sense, participation in the process promotes acceptance of theresults of that process by both the individuals affected and society moregenerally.  As with the instrumental benefits, here too increasing the272saliency of participation is likely to facilitate such acceptance. Simplybeing able to see her arguments featured prominently atop a court’sdecision is likely to help a litigant believe that those arguments were takeninto appropriate account in the decision-making process.
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273. Thanks to my colleague Scott Moss for this observation. Framing arguments implementedin this way would likely be somewhat less beneficial than framing arguments included as part ofan opinion generated by a court. While their effect on external monitoring would remain the same,the absence of the arguments during the drafting and circulation stage would leave the difficultiesof internal monitoring unchanged. At the same time, the direct effects on judicial behavior wouldlikely be reduced, as the lack of a constant reminder of the need for responsiveness would lead toreduced measurement of responsiveness, and as a result less management of it.274. See STERN, supra note 94, at 263 (noting that statements of the issues or questionspresented are required in most jurisdictions, while statements of apposite authority are lessuniformly required).275. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 43-44 (1990).
B.  ImplementationThe precise format of framing arguments could vary widely. In termsof deployment in opinions, the arguments could be placed at the top of anopinion, in the body, or even in an opening footnote. Turning to content,the parties might be restricted to merely including information that isalready present in their briefs (most likely their respective statements ofthe issues), or they might be required to generate a wholly distinctstatement of what they believe to be the most significant aspects of thecase. Word and issue limits could easily be applied. Some jurisdictionsmight broaden the device to allow or require the parties to include astatement of the cases, statutes, or other authorities that are most centralto their arguments. The means of implementation might likewise vary.While the use of framing arguments might be required by court rule or bystatute, individual judges (who, as we have seen, are relatively unrestrictedin how they write opinions) could simply choose to start including themin their opinions. Indeed, a version of the mechanism could be employedwith no court involvement at all if a legal publisher were to choose toinclude the parties’ issue statements in its reports of opinions.  It might273also include each party’s list of the cases, statutes, or other authorities thatare most central to its arguments. What is significant is not so much theprecise format as the notion that the parties have an opportunity to framethe issues before the court in a way that becomes part of the court’sopinion.As changes go, this would hardly be disruptive. Courts in mostjurisdictions already require parties to include issue statements in theirbriefs, and may require statements of apposite authority.  While the274creation of framing arguments might require a slightly different emphasis,it would not introduce a new element into the process, nor even requiremore from counsel than they should already be doing. There is, indeed,some historical precedent for the use of framing arguments. In the earliestAmerican law reporters, summaries of the facts and arguments of counselprepared by the reporter customarily accompanied judicial opinions.275
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Surrency notes that his examination of the prefaces to the reports lead to the conclusion “that thereporters considered the preparation of the summaries of the arguments of counsel to be their mostarduous task.” Id. at 43. Surrency notes the demise of these summaries, but does not offer a causefor their discontinuation.276. Cf. POSNER, supra note 11, at 176-77 (explaining courts’ increasing reliance on standardsof review as a reaction to caseload pressures and the increased size of the federal judiciary, bothof which have made informal monitoring less reliable and, accordingly, rules-based monitoringmore desirable).277. See generally Note, Satisfying the “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of ApparentImpropriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2708 (2004) (considering therelationship between apparent and actual impropriety).
Framing arguments are somewhat different in format, because they wouldbe prepared by the parties and likely subject to length limitations, butsimilar in function to these summaries.VI.  CONCLUSIONWhen judging in accordance with the idealized conception of appellateadjudication represented an achievable ideal, it was perhaps unnecessaryto be concerned with judicial inactivism for the simple reason thatinstitutional design generated results largely in accord with theadjudicative duty. Those days are past.  It is not possible to establish276conclusively that changes in the manner in which appellate courts operatehave rendered them unable to satisfy the adjudicative duty in a substantialportion of their cases. But it is clear that the changed conditions ofadjudication have resulted in an environment substantially more conduciveto inactivism. What is more, in the case of adjudicative legitimacy,perception is, in large part, reality.  For some time now, the perception277from both within the judiciary and among the bar is that appellate courtsare failing to deliver what we expect from them.This Article has attempted to further define the appropriate content ofour expectations for the judiciary and to provide a mechanism by whichthey might be better satisfied. Framing arguments are not a panacea. Theirimplementation would, however, increase the barriers to breaches of theadjudicative duty. And by proposing them I hope, if nothing else, to spurfurther consideration of procedural changes that can enhance thefunctioning of courts without relying on decreases in workload to do so.
